

# **Chinese Methods of Interpersonal Conflict Management**

**A Monograph**  
**by**  
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## **Abstract**

CHINESE METHODS OF INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT by Major Christine A. Locke, USAF, 98 pages.

In the future, the United States of America and the Peoples Republic of China have a number of fundamental issues which could escalate into any of multiple levels of conflict, from diplomatic disagreements to war. The United States military and government do not have an outstanding track record of understanding the different cultures with which the nation finds itself in conflict. This paper investigates the differences between American and Chinese interpersonal conflict management styles by looking at the roots of Chinese culture, Chinese and American cultural differences, American conflict management models, and Chinese conflict management models. The paper concludes by applying Chinese and American conflict management styles to contemporary issues involving the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea and the Republic of China. Overall, Americans overtly prefer collaborating or compromising techniques, but unconsciously tend towards competing. When compared to the Chinese, Americans are assertive and adversarial in their approach to conflict management. The Chinese, on the other hand, prefer non-confrontational strategies in order to maintain a harmonious relationship but will modify particular styles depending on the nature of the relationship. They will often involve a third party to mediate and think much more positively about avoidance and accommodation than Americans. Like the Americans, the Chinese also prefer compromise and collaboration, providing that common ground already exists between the two parties. Facework provides an overarching strategy to maintain one's face within the group and determines which style has preference in a given circumstance.

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## CHAPTER 1: Introduction--The Universalistic Nature of Conflict

Conflict is something each person deals with every day, ranging across the spectrum from trivial to profound. However, while we continuously deal with conflict in our lives, very few individuals spend time studying interpersonal conflict. The military, as a profession focused on very powerful forms of conflict resolution, needs to study it in depth. The United States (US) military needs to understand conflict not only from the Western tradition but also from the viewpoints of its adversaries, from their cultures.

North Korean counterfeiting and nuclear weapons . . . Taiwan . . . arms deals . . . natural resources . . . space . . . missile defense . . . economics . . . global warming . . . proliferation of nuclear technology. These, along with a myriad of other issues, are areas where the national interests of the US and the People's Republic of China (PRC) may conflict in the future. These potential conflicts do not necessarily need to be antagonistic, but they must be managed to avoid missteps and escalation.

While the US is currently focused on Middle Eastern issues, the military cannot afford to become myopic in what is increasingly a multipolar world. Before interacting with the Chinese as allies trying to eliminate North Korean weapons of mass destruction or as adversaries in another venue, the future leaders of the US national security structure need to understand the different methods of Chinese interpersonal conflict management, which differ significantly from the standard Western model normally taught in the services' Professional Military Education (PME) system.

This paper begins with a basic definition of the two major concepts of this monograph, conflict, from both the American and Chinese perspective, and culture. Chapter 2 then expands the culture aspect in a comparison of US and China using the cross cultural five dimensional framework developed by Geert Hofstede. While there are several other models available, such as Trompenaars' Value Dimensions and the Project GLOBE (Global Leadership and Organizational

Behavior Effectiveness) Cultural Dimensions, Hofstede is the most frequently quoted reference in academic papers discussing conflict management.<sup>1</sup> Chapter 3 presents an overview of the American dual concern model of conflict management behaviors as taught in PME in the US Army and US Air Force and shows the American preferences in relation to Hofstede's five dimensions. This monograph does not delve into the historical and cultural reasons why Americans prefer certain conflict management behaviors over others. Aside from length considerations, most American military members are aware of their philosophical ancestors and origins of their analytical culture.

With the basis of American behavior established, the monograph then presents the reasons behind the different Chinese methods of interpersonal conflict management. Chapter 4 presents the historical and cultural background to give insight to the Chinese preferences. This background is included because, unlike US history, most Americans are unfamiliar with the history and detailed knowledge of Chinese culture. The roots of Chinese culture trace back to China's history of agrarianism, the nature of the Chinese language itself, and Chinese philosophy. From these roots grow five elements that form a basis for conflict management behavior. It is important to acknowledge that the information presented in this chapter is a generalization. China is a vast, populous nation and individuals will react differently to a given situation based on their particular upbringing, education, and socio-economic background. This intent behind the presentation of this material is to give a military member a basic understanding of Chinese culture from which to deviate, depending on specific circumstances. Chapter 5 builds upon the background information to analyze specific Chinese methods of interpersonal conflict management. The chapter first presents the dual harmony model created by Leung et al. which is intended to augment the American dual concern model presented in chapter 3. Then the five

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<sup>1</sup>Helen Deresky, *International Management: Managing Across Boarders and Cultures*, 5th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc., 2006), 92, 96.

categories from the dual concern model are expanded from the original American definitions to include behavior based on Chinese relationship types. Relationships in Chinese society generally are categorized by three different groups, in-group vertical, in-group horizontal, and out-group. Each conflict management style is applied differently to each and conflict management preferences change depending on the relationship type. There exists one Chinese behavior, third party involvement, which is a separate Chinese method not addressed in any of the Western models. Facework, which is not a style in itself, uses all of the behaviors in order to preserve an individual's or group's face and is an important consideration within all relationships.

Finally, chapter 6 synthesizes the above information into two case studies, an analysis of the conflicts between China and North Korea and China and Taiwan, both of which could impact US interests in the near future. While interpersonal conflict management styles do not necessarily translate directly to the international and strategic level, the underlying cultural values presented in chapter 4 impact negotiations and strategic culture. In his research on strategic culture during the Ming dynasty, Alastair Iain Johnston discovered there existed two paradigms, one similar to the Western concept of realpolitik and the other following the Confucian-Mencian philosophy.<sup>2</sup> This chapter concentrates on the Confucian-Mencian paradigm and applies the information presented in this monograph to these two conflicts.

## **American Definition of Conflict**

Before one can discuss the different cultural responses to conflict and conflict management styles, one must first have working definitions of conflict from the American perspective, conflict from the Chinese perspective, and culture. This is especially important because there is no one definitive definition of either conflict or culture and the military definitions of both deviate significantly from the academic.

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<sup>2</sup>Alastair I. Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 249.

The Western definition of conflict, from the Compact Oxford English Dictionary online:

noun /konflikt/ 1. a serious disagreement or argument. 2. a prolonged armed struggle. 3. an incompatibility between opinions, principles, etc.: a conflict of interests. ORIGIN Latin *conflictus* “a contest.”<sup>3</sup>

While this monograph is primarily looking at the third meaning of conflict above, researches in the field of interpersonal conflict resolution do not have one unique definition of conflict.<sup>4</sup> Different researchers have used various definitions based on their topic and predispositions. However, a few primary definitions have coalesced.

In a standard of Western conflict resolution studies, Thomas defines conflict as “the process which begins when one party perceives that another has frustrated, or is about to frustrate, some concern of his.”<sup>5</sup> This is the basis of his and Rahim’s dual-concern model, which has been taught to thousands of company grade officers at the Air Force’s Squadron Officer School and field grade officers at both the Army’s Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the Air Force’s Air Command and Staff College (ACSC).

Deutsch defines conflict as “incompatible activities; conflict occurs when the behavior of one person is interfering or obstructing the actions of another.”<sup>6</sup>

The US military has a much stricter definition of conflict than the civilian academic community:

An armed struggle or clash between organized groups within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives. Although regular forces are often involved, irregular forces frequently predominate. Conflict often is protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, and constrained in weaponry and level of violence. Within this state, military power in response to threats may be exercised in an indirect manner while supportive of

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<sup>3</sup>askoxford.com, “Conflict,” [Definition on-line], available from <http://www.askoxford.com/results/?view=dict&field=12668446=conflict&branch=13842570&textsearchtype=exact&sortorder=score%2Cname>; Internet; accessed on 19 February 2007.

<sup>4</sup>Ching Ching Cheung and Kong Bieng Chuah, “Intergroup Conflict Management Framework for Hong Kong’s Manufacturing Industry,” *Engineering Management Journal* 12, no. 3 (September 2000): 28.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

other instruments of national power. Limited objectives may be achieved by the short, focused, and direct application of force.<sup>7</sup>

Ting-Toomey, known for her theories on Chinese facework, defines conflict as “a form of intense interpersonal and/or intrapersonal dissonance (tension or antagonism) between two or more interdependent parties based on incompatible goals, needs, desires, values, beliefs, and/or attitudes.”<sup>8</sup> This definition has the benefit of looking at conflict from a more holistic point of view, especially compared to the US Department of Defense definition above, which makes it the best definition for this paper. However, while there is a good definition to analysis this topic in English, the whole point of this monograph is to ensure understanding conflict from the Chinese perspective.

## 矛盾--“Conflict” in Chinese

The most common translation for the word conflict in Chinese is *mao-dun*.<sup>9</sup> The character *mao* (矛) is the ideogram for spear and the character *dun* (盾) for shield. While *mao-dun* literally translates to the English word “contradiction,” it captures the essence and intent of the American word “conflict.” The original word *mao-dun* traces back to an ancient Chinese legend. A weapons maker was promoting a spear which was capable of penetrating any shield. He then put down the spear, picked up a shield, and claimed the shield was impenetrable by any spear. The audience asked what would happen if the spear was put against the shield. The

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<sup>7</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 April 2001 amended through 1 March 2007), 112.

<sup>8</sup>Xuejian Yu, “The Chinese ‘Native’ Perspective on *Mao-Dun* (Conflict) and *Mao-Dun* Resolution Strategies: A Qualitative Investigation,” *Intercultural Communication Studies* VII 1 (1997-1998): 64.

<sup>9</sup>This monograph uses the *Pinyin* transliteration (example Mao Zedong or *dao*) for Chinese words and names as much as possible. The Wade-Giles transliteration (example Mao Tse-Tung or *tao*) is preserved, however, when used in book or article titles.

weapons maker could not answer the question and left in shame. Thus, the original meaning was “logically incompatible” or “mutually apposed.”<sup>10</sup>

There are other terms used to depict “conflict” in Chinese. Terms such as *jiu fen*--dispute, *wen ti*--problem, *chong tu*--clash, or *fen qi*--difference or divergence, are used by interviewees in various qualitative studies.<sup>11</sup> But *mao-dun* is the most frequent.

The word *mao-dun* has changed during modern times. In Mao Zedong’s philosophical works “On Practice” and “On Contradiction,” he shows the universality of *mao-dun* in nature. He wrote, “there is nothing that does not contain contradiction, without contradiction nothing would exist.”<sup>12</sup> Mao states this universality has two meanings, “one is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end.”<sup>13</sup> He cites three different examples, natural, social, and ideological or intrapersonal.<sup>14</sup> Of the three, Mao was most interested in the social aspect to describe changing relationships between groups or classes of people.<sup>15</sup>

## Definition of Culture

Hofstede defined culture as “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one category of people from those of another.”<sup>16</sup> According to Helen Deresky in *International Management: Managing Across Boarders and Cultures*:

The culture of a society comprises the shared values, understandings, assumptions, and goals that are learned from earlier generations, imposed by present members of a society and passed on to succeeding generations. This shared outlook results, in large part, in common attitudes, codes of conduct, and

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid., 65.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., 64.

<sup>12</sup>Mao Zedong. “On Contradiction,” [Archive on-line], available from [http://marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1\\_17.htm](http://marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_17.htm); Internet; accessed on 31 January 2007.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Yu, “The Chinese ‘Native’ Perspective on Mao-Dun,” 65.

<sup>16</sup>Geert Hofstede, “The Cultural Relativity of the Quality of Life Concept,” *Academy of Management.the Academy of Management Review* 9, no. 3 (July 1984): 389.

expectations that subconsciously guide and control certain norms of behavior. One is born into, not with, a given culture, and gradually internalizes its subtle effects through the socialization process. Culture results in a basis for living grounded in shared communication, standards, codes of conduct, and expectations.<sup>17</sup>

The US Department of Defense and North Atlantic Treaty Organization definition is very different from any of the above definitions, making culture a very physical object:

A feature of the terrain that has been constructed by man. Included are such items as roads, buildings, and canals; boundary lines; and, in a broad sense, all names and legends on a map.<sup>18</sup>

Because this paper will focus on not only the similarities and differences between Chinese and American methods of interpersonal conflict management, but the underlying cultural reasons why the Chinese behave as they do, the Deresky definition of culture quoted above will be the one used for this paper.

A subset of culture is strategic culture. While there are many definitions available, for the purposes of the case studies presented in chapter 6, this paper will use the definition presented by Johnston in his book *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*:

Strategic culture is comprised of two key elements. The first is a central paradigm, or a central set of assumptions that provides answers to three questions: what role does conflict or warfare play in human affairs; what is the nature of the enemy and the threat it poses; and how efficacious is the use of force in dealing with threats to state security? The second element should flow logically from the first. That is, on the basis of these assumptions, the empirical footprint of strategic culture should be a ranked set of grand strategic preferences that is consistent across relevant objects of analysis.<sup>19</sup>

Now that the basic definitions have been presented, this paper will address a comparison of American and Chinese culture based on Hofstede's cross-cultural studies.

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<sup>17</sup>Deresky, International Management, 83.

<sup>18</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 136.

<sup>19</sup>Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, 248.

## CHAPTER 2: Comparison of the US and China using Cross-Cultural studies

Many conflict researchers assert culture is vital in molding people's perceptions, attitudes, and appraisals of conflict and its management.<sup>20</sup> Unfortunately, while most research concerning conflict management styles has originated in the West, a useful, accurate theory developed within the confines of one culture may not apply within others.<sup>21</sup> In order to provide a framework for analyzing different cultural characteristics, Hofstede developed a model with four cultural dimensions: power distance, individualism versus collectivism, masculinity versus femininity, and uncertainty avoidance.<sup>22</sup> Because this model did not originally consider some of the unique characteristics of Asian cultures, Bond added a fifth dimension, long term versus short term orientation.<sup>23</sup> These dimensions represent the basic elements of a given culture and are useful for understanding the relationships, roles, and actions of the individuals within that culture.<sup>24</sup> One important note: this model is just a mental construct and exists only to create generalities which simplify different cultural behaviors.<sup>25</sup> As shown in Table 1, comparison studies between the US and China show the two cultures are very different in all five dimensions. Understanding these cultural differences is crucial to understanding how each culture approaches conflict management. For a military member assigned to a location with an unfamiliar culture, this construct also presents a useful framework to begin studying to become familiar with the similarities and differences with American culture.

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<sup>20</sup>Frances P. Brew and David R. Cairns, "Styles of Managing Interpersonal Workplace Conflict in Relation to Status and Face Concern: A Study with Anglos and Chinese," *International Journal of Conflict Management* 15, no. 1 (2004): 28.

<sup>21</sup>Daniel Z. Ding, "Exploring Chinese Conflict Management Styles in Joint Ventures in the People's Republic of China," *Management Research News* 19, no. 9 (1996): 44.

<sup>22</sup>Hofstede, "The Cultural Relativity of the Quality of Life Concept," 390.

<sup>23</sup>Geert Hofstede and Michael Harris Bond, "The Confucius Connection: From Cultural Roots to Economic Growth," *Organizational Dynamics* 16, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 16.

<sup>24</sup>Low Sui Pheng and Shi Yuquan, "An Exploratory Study of Hofstede's Cross-Cultural Dimensions in Construction Projects," *Management Decision* 40, no. 1/2 (2002): 7.

<sup>25</sup>Geert Hofstede, "Cultural Constraints in Management Theories," *The Executive* 7, no. 1 (February 1993): 89.

**Table 1. Cultural Dimension Scores of United States and China.**

Cultural Dimension Scores					
	Power Distance	Individualism	Masculinity	Uncertainty Avoidance	Long-term Orientation
<b>United States</b>	40 L	91 H	62 H	46 L	29 L
<b>China</b>	80 H	20 L	50 M	60 M	118 H

Source: Geert Hofstede, "Cultural Constraints in Management Theories," *The Executive* 7, no. 1 (February 1993): 91.

Note: 91H = top third, M = medium third, L = bottom third (among 53 countries and regions for the first four dimensions; among 23 countries for the fifth).

## **Power Distance: A Measure of Inequality Within a Society**

This defines how much inequality in power a less powerful person is willing to accept as normal. It also indicates how dependent an adult is on more powerful individuals within the society. According to Hofstede, "inequality exists within any culture, but the degree of it that is tolerated varies between one culture and another."<sup>26</sup> Table 1 shows Americans are less willing to tolerate power inequality than their Chinese counterparts, which is reflected in some of the starker differences found in governance and economics.<sup>27</sup> Americans normally expect some level consultation, but they do not always demand it. While some privileges and status differences are acceptable, laws and rules apply equally to superiors and subordinates, making the US a medium power distance society.<sup>28</sup> China, on the other hand, is a large power distance society. Citizens expect leaders to act without consultation, and the laws and rules are different for those leaders.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid., 91.

<sup>27</sup>Pan Fan and Zhang Zigang, "Cross-Cultural Challenges when Doing Business in China," *Singapore Management Review* 26, no. 1 (2004): 83.

<sup>28</sup>Hofstede, "The Cultural Relativity of the Quality of Life Concept," 389.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid.

## **Individualism versus Collectivism: Level of Integration in a Society**

This defines how much an individual looks after their own needs, interests, rights, or goals over those of larger social organizations. Each person in a collectivist culture belongs to one or several interdependent “in-groups,” an extended family, clan, or organization, usually for life.<sup>30</sup> According to Hofstede, “a collectivist society is tightly integrated; an individualistic society is loosely integrated.”<sup>31</sup> Studies show that Americans are very individualistic while Chinese are strongly collectivistic. As a result, the Chinese have a heightened in-group versus out-group differentiation and give priority to obligations to in-groups.<sup>32</sup> Another example of the difference between the two cultures is manifested in how an employee is compensated for work. In the US, success is accomplished by individual effort; therefore, pay should be based on performance. In China, success is accomplished by cooperation and group effort; therefore, everyone in the group should be paid equally.<sup>33</sup> Ironically, despite the individualistic nature of American society, US military pay charts are based on the principle of equality, not performance.

## **Masculinity versus Femininity: Motivations and Social Roles**

The terms masculinity and femininity bring along a certain amount of cultural bias which can distract from Hofstede’s definition. In his work, this cultural dimension defines how much a culture uses the biological differences between the two sexes to define different social roles and motivations. According to Hofstede, “masculinity in society relates to the desirability of achievement; femininity relates to interpersonal relationships.”<sup>34</sup> A masculine society expects men to be aggressive, competitive, ambitious, and to strive for material success while women care for children, the weak, and strive for a nonmaterial quality of life. A more feminine culture

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<sup>30</sup>Hofstede, “The Cultural Relativity of the Quality of Life Concept,” 389.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Brew and Cairns, “Styles of Managing Interpersonal Workplace Conflict,” 29.

<sup>33</sup>Fan and Zigang, “Cross-Cultural Challenges when Doing Business in China,” 89.

<sup>34</sup>Hofstede, “The Cultural Relativity of the Quality of Life Concept,” 390.

has overlapping roles for men and women and both sexes may respect the weak, small, or slow.

Both types of cultures typically use the male's values within political and work organizations.

Thus, according to Hofstede, "in masculine cultures these political/organizational values stress material success and assertiveness. In feminine cultures they stress other types of quality of life, interpersonal relationships, and concern for the weak."<sup>35</sup>

This category specifically addresses different motivations present in diverse cultures. For Americans, Maslow's "Hierarchy of Needs" model reflects individualistic motivations perfectly; security at the bottom, social, esteem, autonomy, and self-actualization at the top.<sup>36</sup> Unfortunately a fourteen country study by Haire, Ghiselli, and Potter showed that only people in the US ranked their needs in this exact order, every other country deviated.<sup>37</sup> Chinese values such as "harmony" or "family support" are not included in the model. Hofstede theorized that even if the needs were correct, they would be ordered differently for other cultures.<sup>38</sup> According to Patrick Gambrel and Rebecca Cianci, when considering the Chinese, Maslow's Hierarchy should be rearranged to reflect different needs than Americans: (1) belonging, (2) physiological needs, (3) safety, and (4). self-actualization within Chinese society.<sup>39</sup> Unfortunately, Maslow's theory is taught as a universalistic model in PME. Military members attempting to apply Maslow's Hierarchy to a foreign culture must avoid value judgments and mirror imaging in order to successfully relate to the host culture.

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<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

<sup>36</sup>Patrick A. Gambrel and Rebecca Cianci, "Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs: Does it Apply in A Collectivist Culture," *Journal of Applied Management and Entrepreneurship* 8, no. 2 (April 2003): 145.

<sup>37</sup>Hofstede, "The Cultural Relativity of the Quality of Life Concept," 396.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

<sup>39</sup>Deresky, *International Management*, 412; Gambrel and Cianci, "Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs: Does it Apply in A Collectivist Culture," 157.

## **Uncertainty Avoidance: Comfort level with Confusion**

This defines how uncomfortable people become in situations that are unstructured, unclear or unpredictable and the extent they avoid such situations by adopting a belief in absolute truths or strict codes of behavior.<sup>40</sup> According to Hofstede, “[High] uncertainty avoidance favors strict rules and principles, while its opposite favors opportunism and tolerance of deviant behavior.<sup>41</sup> A society with strong uncertainty avoidance is very rigid and “what is different is dangerous,” while one with weak uncertainty avoidance is flexible and “what is different is curious.”<sup>42</sup> This is one of the reasons why the majority of small Chinese enterprises tend to be family-owned with no separation between the owner and management.<sup>43</sup> There tend to be few outside employees because it is assumed that the non-family members are simply learning and bidding their time in order to create their own business.<sup>44</sup>

## **Long-Term versus Short-Term Orientation: The Value of Time**

This defines how willing a person is to give up short-term objectives in order to gain in the long run and how much of an emphasis is placed on long-term consequences or objectives.<sup>45</sup> A culture with a long-term orientation values thrift and perseverance while a short-term orientation looks to the present or past and values tradition and fulfilling social obligations.<sup>46</sup> A recent study “proved” what was common knowledge: Americans are focused on the short-term bottom line while the Chinese emphasize responsibility towards society with profit goals beyond

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<sup>40</sup>Hofstede, “The Cultural Relativity of the Quality of Life Concept,” 390.

<sup>41</sup>Geert Hofstede, “Business Cultures,” *UNESCO Courier* 47 (April 1994): 12.

<sup>42</sup>Hofstede, “Cultural Constraints in Management Theories,” 90.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., 86.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid.

<sup>45</sup>Chee W. Chow, F. Johnny Deng, and Joanna L. Ho, “The Openness of Knowledge Sharing within Organizations: A Comparative Study in the United States and the People’s Republic of China,” *Journal of Management Accounting Research* 12 (2000): 68.

<sup>46</sup>Hofstede, “Cultural Constraints in Management Theories,” 90.

ten years ahead.<sup>47</sup> This dimension contains four sub-factors, human-heartedness, moral discipline, integration, and Confucian work dynamism.<sup>48</sup>

These five dimensions are interdependent and overlap considerably. It is impossible to isolate one element from the others. They provide a useful construct on how to learn about different cultures in general and can provide insight on how an individual in a particular culture may handle interpersonal conflict. Obviously two military commanders from cultures that are on opposite extremes of each dimensions will have difficulty working with one another unless both make a conscious effort to see the world from the other's perspective. The importance of this model is not only to comprehend the inner workings of another culture, but to provide a framework for understanding one's own culture as well.

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<sup>47</sup>Geert Hofstede, Cheryl A. Van Deusen, Carolyn B. Mueller, and Thomas A. Charles, "What Goals do Business Leaders Pursue? A Study in Fifteen Countries," *Journal of International Business Studies* 33, no. 4 (Fourth Quarter 2002): 795.

<sup>48</sup>Richard H. Franke, Geert Hofstede, and Michael H. Bond, "Cultural Roots of Economic Performance: A Research Note," *Strategic Management Journal* 12 (Summer 1991): 167.

## CHAPTER 3: Overview of the American Dual Concern Model

Before moving directly on to Chinese methods of conflict management, it is important to have a basic understanding of American behaviors first. Not only is it important to understand one's own cultural preferences, but most research into conflict management and motivation theory began in the US. This chapter reviews the dual concern model and its five styles of conflict management, American style preferences for conflict management, and the shortfalls of the dual concern model. As stated above, this monograph will not discuss the reasons why Americans prefer certain conflict management behaviors over others because of the assumed familiarity with American history and Western philosophy.

Both CGSC and ACSC instruct students on methods of conflict management.<sup>49</sup> The model used at each school is based on the “Dual Concern” model which has been used extensively in conflict management research.<sup>50</sup> In this model, “concern for self” is plotted against “concern for others” as shown in Figure 1.<sup>51</sup> Other variations of this model plot “assertiveness versus unassertiveness” against “cooperative versus uncooperative” or “satisfying our needs” against “satisfying the other’s needs.”<sup>52</sup> The model generates five general styles of conflict

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
<sup>49</sup>Department of the Air Force, Air Command and Staff College, *Leadership and Command Phase II* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, July 2002), 40; Department of the Army, Command and General Staff College, L200, *Leadership* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, September 2005), L211RA-2.

<sup>50</sup>Kwok Leung, Pamela Tremain Koch, and Lin Lu, “A Dualistic Model of Harmony and its Implications for Conflict Management in Asia,” *Asia Pacific Journal of Management* 19, no. 2,3 (August 2002): 203.

<sup>51</sup>M. Afzalur Rahim Clement Psenicka, Panagiotis Polychroniou, and Jing-Hua Zhao, “A Model of Emotional Intelligence and Conflict Management Strategies: A Study in Seven Countries,” *International Journal of Organizational Analysis* 10, no. 4 (2002): 307; Sheryl D. Brahnam Thomas M. Margavio, Michael A. Hignite, Tonya B. Barrier, and Jerry M. Chin, “A Gender-Based Categorization for Conflict Resolution,” *The Journal of Management Development* 24, no. 3 (2005): 199.

<sup>52</sup>Department of the Air Force, Air Command and Staff College, *Leadership and Command Phase II*, 40; Department of the Army, Command and General Staff College, L200, *Leadership*, L211RA-2.

management: dominating or competing; yielding, obliging, or accommodating; integrating or collaborating; avoiding; and compromising.<sup>53</sup>



**Figure 1: The dual concern model.**

Source: Department of the Air Force, Air Command and Staff College, *Leadership and Command Phase II* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, July 2002), 40.

<sup>53</sup>Leung, Koch, and Lu, “A Dualistic Model of Harmony,” 203; Department of the Air Force, Air Command and Staff College, *Leadership and Command Phase II*, 40; Department of the Army, Command and General Staff College, L200, *Leadership*, L211RA-2.

## A Review of the Dual Concern Model

Dominating or Competing--high concern for self, low concern for others. This style forces submission upon the other to maximize self gain and is identified with a win-lose attitude, power plays, and intense rivalry.<sup>54</sup> While using this style, people believe that they are better off if others are ineffective or unproductive.<sup>55</sup>

Yielding, Obliging, or Accommodating--low concern for self, high concern for others. This style seeks to de-emphasize differences and emphasizing commonalities and can be referred to as a “tactic of appeasement.”<sup>56</sup> While using this style, people will sacrifice self-interest in order to satisfy the needs of others.<sup>57</sup>

Integrating or Collaborating--high concern for self, high concern for others. This style seeks to solve the problem with a win-win solution and requires openness, trust, equal power, and an exchange of information.<sup>58</sup> When using this style people believe that their goals are linked and both parties can satisfy their needs at the same time.<sup>59</sup>

Avoiding--low concern for self, low concern for others. This style ignores conflict and hopes it will disappear. It is also identified with withdrawal and buck-passing and uses secrecy to

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<sup>54</sup>Department of the Air Force, Air Command and Staff College, *Leadership and Command Phase II*, 37.

<sup>55</sup>Dean Tjosvold, Margaret Poon, and Zi-you Yu, “Team Effectiveness in China: Cooperative Conflict for Relationship Building,” *Human Relations* 58, no. 3 (March 2005): 346.

<sup>56</sup>Department of the Air Force, Air Command and Staff College, *Leadership and Command Phase II*, 37; Rahim et al., “A Model of Emotional Intelligence and Conflict Management Strategies: A Study in Seven Countries,” 307.

<sup>57</sup>Tjosvold, Poon, and Yu, “Team Effectiveness in China,” 347.

<sup>58</sup>Department of the Air Force, Air Command and Staff College, *Leadership and Command Phase II*, 37; Brahnam et al., “A Gender-Based Categorization for Conflict Resolution,” 199.

<sup>59</sup>Tjosvold, Poon, and Yu, “Team Effectiveness in China,” 346.

avoid confrontation.<sup>60</sup> When using this style people attempt to smooth over the conflict and minimize any open discussion.<sup>61</sup>

Compromising--intermediate concern for self, intermediate concern for others. This style looks for concessions from both parties to come to an acceptable solution.<sup>62</sup> When using this style people believe that neither party can meet their goals simultaneously; therefore, both must settle for a sub-optimum solution.<sup>63</sup>

## American Preferences for Assertive Modes of Conflict Management

While all five of the dual concern conflict management styles have their uses, Americans value the assertive modes the most, emphasizing the value of openness and direct confrontation of opposing views.<sup>64</sup> While the collaborating style is the most successful and popular, most Americans tend unconsciously towards a competing style.<sup>65</sup> Compromising is a close second because some perceive it as a subset of collaborating.<sup>66</sup> Competing and avoiding styles are generally ineffective but Americans prefer competing over avoiding and accommodating, both of

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<sup>60</sup>Rahim et al., “A Model of Emotional Intelligence and Conflict Management Strategies: A Study in Seven Countries,” 307; Department of the Air Force, Air Command and Staff College, *Leadership and Command Phase II*, 37.

<sup>61</sup>Guoquan Chen and Dean Tjosvold, “Conflict Management and Team Effectiveness in China: The Mediating Role of Justice,” *Asia Pacific Journal of Management* 19, no. 4 (December 2002): 561.

<sup>62</sup>Department of the Air Force, Air Command and Staff College, *Leadership and Command Phase II*, 37; Rahim et al., “A Model of Emotional Intelligence and Conflict Management Strategies: A Study in Seven Countries,” 307.

<sup>63</sup>Department of the Air Force, Air Command and Staff College, *Leadership and Command Phase II*, 37.

<sup>64</sup>Brahnam et al., “A Gender-Based Categorization for Conflict Resolution,” 200; Dean Tjosvold and Haifa F. Sun, “Understanding Conflict Avoidance: Relationship, Motivations, Actions, and Consequences,” *International Journal of Conflict Management* 13, no. 2 (2002): 143.

<sup>65</sup>Brahnam et al., “A Gender-Based Categorization for Conflict Resolution,” 200; Michael W. Morris Katherine Y. Williams, Kwok Leung, and Richard Lerrick, “Conflict Management Style: Accounting for Cross-National Differences,” *Journal of International Business Studies* 29, no. 4 (Fourth Quarter 1998): 730.

<sup>66</sup>Brahnam et al., “A Gender-Based Categorization for Conflict Resolution,” 200.

which have a very negative connotation in the US.<sup>67</sup> Overall, studies show that conflict avoidance tends to reinforce competitive conflict and decrease group commitment.<sup>68</sup>

American's preferences for conflict management styles directly relate to American culture and Hofstede's five dimensions from chapter 2. According to Hofstede, Americans are low on power distance and uncertainty avoidance, medium on masculinity, highly individualistic, and short-term oriented.<sup>69</sup> Thus, when compared to the Chinese, Americans are assertive and adversarial in their approach to conflict.<sup>70</sup> Americans are individualists, focused on their own needs and achievements and are less concerned about animosity.<sup>71</sup> Conflict is natural and neither good nor bad, but, if handled properly, productive.<sup>72</sup> This viewpoint appears utilitarian, superficial, and expedient to the Chinese.<sup>73</sup> According to Pan Fan and Zhang Zigang, from the College of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, China:

[Americans] rely on their own view to determine what they should do. They tend to work alone and are reluctant to cooperate because their individualism and masculine culture view cooperation in general as a sign of weakness and place a high value on independence and control. [A]mericans place greater importance on contractual safeguards than the Chinese. They believe that contracts can ensure that their partners' tendencies to focus on individual goals and aspirations do not interfere with their own individual goals and aspirations. [I]ndividualistic and medium masculine American managers are used to confronting problems directly and bringing things out in the open. To resolve differences, American managers will prefer to use tactics that involve directly confronting others with rational arguments, factual evidence, and suggested solutions. It is also consistent with the pragmatic short- term orientation and moderately low power distance in USA.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>67</sup>Ibid.

<sup>68</sup>Dean Tjosvold Yung-Ho Cho, Ho-Hwan Park, Chaoming Liu, and Whei-Ching Liu, "Interdependence and Managing Conflict with Sub-Contractors in the Construction Industry in East Asia," *Asia Pacific Journal of Management* 18, no. 3 (July 2001): 297.

<sup>69</sup>Hofstede, "Cultural Constraints in Management Theories," 91.

<sup>70</sup>Brew and Cairns, "Styles of Managing Interpersonal Workplace Conflict," 29.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid., 30.

<sup>72</sup>Wenshan Jia, "Facework as a Chinese Conflict-Preventive Mechanism--A Cultural/Discourse Analysis," *Intercultural Communication Studies* VII 1 (1997-1998): 55.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid.

<sup>74</sup>Fan and Zigang, "Cross-Cultural Challenges when Doing Business in China," 85.

Furthermore, Americans are reluctant to involve a third party in a conflict due to the required time and effort.<sup>75</sup> They are very achievement oriented, always “looking out for number one.”<sup>76</sup> Managers and leaders focus on tasks and minimize social relationships.<sup>77</sup>

### **Shortfalls of the Dual Concern Model: Time, Context, and Instrumentality**

The dual concern model of conflict management suffers from three serious shortfalls, it does not consider the dimension of time, it focuses on the individual outside of the context of culture, and it focuses only on the instrumentality of conflict behavior. The lack of these considerations makes the model difficult to apply to non-Western cultures. First, most interpersonal conflicts change over time.<sup>78</sup> Thus, an individual’s style of managing that conflict may change over time as well. It is possible that an individual may decide on the avoiding style due to circumstances then switch to a more assertive style when the conditions are right. In addition, an individual’s tendency to look at long-term effects vice short-term effects will change conflict management behaviors. Second, this model assumes the parties involved belong to the same individualistic culture. It takes the person outside the context of the base culture and does not address group dynamics. According to Hofstede:

Culture can be compared to a forest, while individuals are tree. A forest is not just a bunch of trees: it is a symbiosis of different trees, bushes, plants, insects, animals and micro-organisms, and we miss the essence of the forest if we only describe its most typical trees. In the same way, a culture cannot be satisfactorily described in terms of the characteristics of a typical individual. There is a tendency in the U.S. management literature to overlook the forest for the trees and to ascribe cultural differences to interactions among individuals.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>75</sup>Ibid., 86

<sup>76</sup>Morris et al., “Conflict Management Style: Accounting for Cross-National Differences,” 734.

<sup>77</sup>Fan and Zigang, “Cross-Cultural Challenges when Doing Business in China,” 87.

<sup>78</sup>Kwang-Kuo Hwang, “*Guanzi* and *Mientze*: Conflict Resolution in Chinese Society,” *Intercultural Communication Studies* VII 1 (1997-1998): 24.

<sup>79</sup>Hofstede, “Cultural Constraints in Management Theories,” 92.

Last, the dual concern model looks only at outcome or instrumental concern. The desired quality or type of the relationship between the self and the other is not addressed.<sup>80</sup>

While the dual concern model suffers from several shortfalls, it works very well within a society that is highly individualistic, assertive, and achievement oriented such as America. It is the model taught by CGSC and ACSC and used extensively in conflict management research in the US. Typically Americans tend to use the competing style but the most successful and popular is the collaborating style. Most Americans have a negative opinion concerning the avoiding and accommodating styles and will therefore utilize them less often. When working with other cultures, however, it is important not to mirror image American preferences onto foreigners. As shown by the shortfalls in this chapter and information presented in chapter 5, the dual concern model is not universal. It cannot be blindly applied to another culture that is radically different from US culture using Hofstede's five dimensions presented in chapter 2. Therefore, with a firm understanding of the dominate American model of conflict management, a knowledge of Chinese cultural differences is required before finally moving on to Chinese methods of conflict management.

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<sup>80</sup>Leung, Koch, and Lu, "A Dualistic Model of Harmony," 201.

## CHAPTER 4: Elements of Chinese Culture Impacting Conflict Management Styles

How an individual develops strategies for interpersonal conflict management is very dependent on his or her culture; the Chinese are no exception. There are five major elements of Chinese culture that cause Chinese methods of conflict management to differ from American styles, *he* (harmony), *mianzi* and *lian* (face), *guanxi* (personal connections), *shehui dengji* (social status), and *zhengti guannian* (holistic thinking). It is impossible; however, to isolate these elements from their deep roots in the history of Chinese culture. Because this history and culture is significantly different from and relatively unknown by Americans, this chapter is presented in some detail to capture some of the concepts that cause different conflict solution sets from Americans. It is important to remember this is a broad overview of the underlying Chinese culture. Individual behavior will deviate from this model depending on circumstances and experience.

### Roots of Chinese Culture: Agrarianism, Language, and Philosophy

The Chinese culture is one of the longest continuous existing cultures on Earth, tracing its history back more than 3,000 years. Thus, some of the elements of Chinese methods of conflict management trace back to China's history of agrarianism, the nature of the Chinese language itself, and Chinese philosophy.

The nation and culture of China developed as a continental, agrarian society. People have depended primarily on agriculture and large-scale irrigation for the entire history of China. According to Wittfogel, societies such as China became highly organized and collectivist in nature because survival depended on large-scale irrigation and flood control projects.<sup>81</sup> Even

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<sup>81</sup>Karl A. Wittfogel, "Oriental Society in Transition with Special Reference to Pre-Communist and Communist China," *The Far Eastern Quarterly (Pre-1986)* 14, no. 4 (August 1955): 471; Qiguang Zhao, "Chinese Mythology in the Context of Hydraulic Society," *Asian Folklore Studies* 48, no. 2 (1989): 232.

today, two-thirds of the Chinese population lives in communal rural areas, primarily as farmers.<sup>82</sup>

Very rarely do any of the ancient philosophers, historians, or military experts mention traveling on the open sea.<sup>83</sup> According to Chinese philosopher Feng Yu-Lan, “to the ancient Chinese their land was the world. There are two expressions in the Chinese language which can both be translated as the world. One is “all beneath the sky” and the other is “all within the four seas.” To the people of a maritime country such as the Greeks, it would be inconceivable that the expressions such as these could be synonymous. But in Chinese they are.”<sup>84</sup>

As a result of this agrarianism, Chinese economic and social thinking has orientated itself around the use of the land. Chinese sages historically divided society into four traditional classes, the scholars, peasants, artisans, and merchants. The farmers, who cultivated the land, and the scholars, who were the landlords, were the most prestigious classes because of their connection to agriculture, “the root.” The merchants occupied by only commerce, “the branch,” were looked down upon as the lowest of the low.<sup>85</sup> Social and economic thought over the millennia have tended “to emphasize the root and slight the branch.”<sup>86</sup> The traditional emphasis carried forward to the Cultural Revolution when bureaucrats and students were sent to the countryside to be “reeducated” by the virtuous peasantry.<sup>87</sup> Furthermore, while governments came and went the relationship with the land and one’s family never changed, forming a very strong collectivistic society that trusted personal relationships over the government.<sup>88</sup>

While agrarianism impacts the social orientation of Chinese culture, the very nature of the Chinese language also has an impact. Because of the pictographic nature of the written

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<sup>82</sup>John L. Graham and N. Mark Lam, “The Chinese Negotiation,” *Harvard Business Review* 81, no. 10 (October 2003): 84.

<sup>83</sup>Yu-lan Feng and Derk Bodde, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, 1st Free Press paperback ed. (New York, NY: Free Press, 1966), 17.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid., 18.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid.

<sup>87</sup>Graham and Lam, “The Chinese Negotiation,” 84.

<sup>88</sup>Xuejian Yu, “The Chinese ‘Native’ Perspective on Mao-Dun,” 77.

language, Chinese people tend to see the whole picture at once, while Americans tend to focus on the details.<sup>89</sup> Furthermore, China is a relatively high context culture. According to Wiseman and others, “in high context cultures much of the meaning of a communication transaction is within the individual or embedded within the context while in low context cultures the meaning of a message must be explicitly verbally encoded.”<sup>90</sup> The story of “*mao-dun*” from chapter 1 is a perfect example. A foreigner learning written Chinese would not understand the character “spear” and “shield” together meant “contradiction” without knowledge of the legend behind it.

The highly contextual nature of the Chinese culture defines the indirect style of Chinese philosophy. Chinese philosophy is written almost entirely using aphorisms, apothegms, allusions, and illustrations.<sup>91</sup> According to philosopher Feng Yu-Lan, “the sayings and writings of the Chinese philosophers are so inarticulate that their suggestiveness is almost boundless.”<sup>92</sup> Thus, a reader can interpret the work in many different ways. Unfortunately, when highly suggestive language from a high context culture such as China is translated to a very direct language from a low context culture such as the US, subtle nuances important in conflict management are lost causing misunderstanding, lost opportunities, or escalation.

The importance of philosophy to the Chinese culture cannot be overstated. As Chinese philosopher Feng Yu-Lan states, “according to Chinese tradition, the study of philosophy is not a profession. Everyone should study philosophy just as in the West every one should go to church. In the old days, if a man were educated at all, the first education he received was in philosophy. When children went to school, the Four [Confucian] Books were the first ones they were taught

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<sup>89</sup>Graham and Lam, “The Chinese Negotiation,” 85.

<sup>90</sup>Richard L. Wiseman Judith A. Sanders, Jeanine K. Congalton, Robert H. Gass Jr, Kiyoko Sueda, and Du Ruiqing, “A Cross-Cultural Analysis of Compliance Gaining: China, Japan, and the United States,” *Intercultural Communication Studies* V 1 (1995): 4.

<sup>91</sup>Feng and Bodde, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, 12.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid.

to read.”<sup>93</sup> There are four major belief systems that significantly influence Chinese society, Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism and Mao Zedong Thought. Like all philosophies, these have changed and adapted over time. It is very difficult to differentiate between Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism because they have all borrowed, taken, or expanded upon each other over time. According to Feng Yu-Lan, “we can say that the Neo-Confucianists more consistently adhere to the fundamental ideas of Daoism and Buddhism than do the Daoists and Buddhists themselves.”<sup>94</sup>

## **Confucianism: The Transmitter of Traditional Family Values**

The most influential Chinese philosophy is Confucianism. The philosophy of Confucianism, specifically the “School of Literati,” was founded by Confucius (~551-479 BC), the Latinized version of K’ung fu Tzu. Confucius was China’s first private teacher and his ideas are best known through the *Lun Yü*, Confucian Analects. Confucius felt he was interpreting ancient cultural heritage; he was “a transmitter not an originator.”<sup>95</sup> While propagating traditional ideas, he augmented them with his own moral code. One of the best known Confucian scholars, Mencius (~371-~289 BC) added significantly to the philosophy, specifically that the inherent nature of man is good.<sup>96</sup>

The major elements of philosophy that Confucius taught covered all aspects of social life and formed the backbone of traditional family system. He believed a person’s ultimate goal should be to become a *jun zi*, the ideal gentleman, and that the only important difference between men was that of moral worth. In order to become a gentleman, one must cultivate one’s moral

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<sup>93</sup>Ibid., 1, 11.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid., 318.

<sup>95</sup>Ibid., 40

<sup>96</sup>Ibid., 68-9.

character and follow the *li*, the rules of conduct. Rulers of society were supposed to be scholars and gentlemen.

In order to cultivate one's moral self to become a gentleman, it was important to develop *yi*, righteousness, *ren*, benevolence or humaneness, *de*, moral integrity, virtue or power, *zhi*, wisdom, *yong*, courage, *xin*, consistency between word and deed, and *jing*, reverence. Of these elements, *yi* and *ren* were the most important. *Yi* referred to the "oughtness" of a situation; every person had morally right things to do.<sup>97</sup> Not only was it important to do the right thing, but for the right reason, *ren*, "loving others."<sup>98</sup> Two components of *ren* were *zhong* and *shu*.<sup>99</sup> *Zhong* was the positive, doing one's best and conscientiousness to others while *shu* was the negative, "do not do to others what you do not wish yourself."<sup>100</sup> Confucius said, "I set my heart on the Way, base myself on virtue, lean upon benevolence for support and take my recreation in the arts."<sup>101</sup>

*Li* was more than just rites and rituals; it regulated the relationships and conflicts between people to maintain harmony and prevent chaos.<sup>102</sup> To guide appropriate behavior, Confucius defined the five cardinal relationships; the father-son; emperor-subject; husband-wife; elder-younger brothers; and friend-friend. The first four were vertical relationships capturing the importance of loyalty and respect of elders while the last was horizontal. Each relationship demanded different duties from all involved. These family relationships were extended to society as a whole, therefore the rectification of names was extremely important because names determined the hierarchy, and therefore relationships, within society. Of all the relationships, that of the parent-child was the most important, demanding *xiao*, filial piety or devotion.<sup>103</sup> This

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<sup>97</sup>Ibid., 42.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid.

<sup>99</sup>Confucius and D. C. Lau, *The Analects (Lun yü)* (Harmondsworth; New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1979), 16.

<sup>100</sup>Feng and Bodde, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, 43; Confucius and Lau, *The Analects (Lun yü)*, 16.

<sup>101</sup>Ibid., 12.

<sup>102</sup>Feng and Bodde, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, 164.

<sup>103</sup>Confucius and Lau, *The Analects (Lun yü)*, 18.

defined the respect and obedience children owed their parents. Confucius held that if everyone in a society followed the *li*, there would be no need for written law. “Guide them by *de*, keep them in line with *li*, and they will, besides having a sense of shame, reform themselves.”<sup>104</sup> *Li* also applied to states and would translate in modern terms to international law and the law of armed conflict.<sup>105</sup> *Li* is still very prevalent today, creating a very formal society where these rituals and formalities are taken for granted and those not following them are ostracized.<sup>106</sup>

Confucianism first gained widespread popular acceptance during the Han dynasty. Emperor Wu (140-87 BC) decreed Confucianism as the official state teaching and it was under his reign that the examination system began. This system allowed any citizen to gain entry into the ranks of government through a series of periodic exams.<sup>107</sup> The basis for the exams was the six Confucian classics. Han Confucianism also gave justification for the Heavenly mandate which allowed the establishment of new dynasties.<sup>108</sup> It was also at this time than Confucian thought expanded and absorbed the school of *Yin-Yang* by linking the five cardinal relationships to the five elements and the theory of *yin* and *yang* and developing a stronger emphasis on harmony.<sup>109</sup>

In the roughly 2,500 years since its original inception, Confucianism, the backbone of family life, has survived at least two intellectual purges designed to eliminate it, the “fires of Ch’in” in 213 BC and the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1900s. Confucianism, as it exists now in Chinese society, is primarily influenced by Chu Hsi (1130-1200) a philosopher during the Sung dynasty from the Neo-Confucian school.<sup>110</sup> He compiled and wrote a commentary on the Four Books: the *Great Learning*, *Doctrine of the Mean*, the *Confucian Analects*, and *Mencius*,

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<sup>104</sup>Ibid., 63.

<sup>105</sup>Feng and Bodde, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, 178.

<sup>106</sup>Graham and Lam, “The Chinese Negotiation,” 84.

<sup>107</sup>Feng and Bodde, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, 192.

<sup>108</sup>Ibid., 214.

<sup>109</sup>Ibid., 196-7.

<sup>110</sup>Ibid., 294.

that became the primary texts for the civil service exams until 1905.<sup>111</sup> The Neo-Confucians developed a metaphysical system that had not existed in previous Confucian thought and absorbed many ideas from Daoism and Buddhism. Even today, the Chinese are proud to be able to quote Confucian philosophy and will often credit Confucianism for conflict management behaviors.<sup>112</sup>

## Daoism: The Relationship Between Man and Nature

While Confucianism was the philosophy of the social life of man and government; Daoism was the philosophy of nature and an individual's place in it.<sup>113</sup> According to Yu-Lan, "Daoists taught the theory of 'doing nothing' whereas the Confucianists taught that of 'doing for nothing.'"<sup>114</sup> Daoism developed as a rival philosophy to Confucianism during the Warring States period. According to tradition, Lao Tzu and his book *Dao Te Ching*, were contemporaries of Confucius but there is significant debate over the existence of the man and when the book was actually written.

The central theme of Daoism was the concept of *Dao*, or "the Way," "the truth," or "the order of nature." Humans were an inherent part of nature; therefore, they should accept change as an intrinsic part of everything.<sup>115</sup> By living in harmony with nature, one can obtain peace and enlightenment.<sup>116</sup> While *dao* existed in Confucian philosophy, it is more humanistic and classical, requiring individual effort, especially scholarship, to follow *dao* and achieve *de--moral* integrity.

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<sup>111</sup>Ibid.

<sup>112</sup>Edwin H. W. Chan and Henry C. H. Suen, "Dispute Resolution Management for International Construction Projects in China," *Management Decision* 43, no. 4 (2005): 591.

<sup>113</sup>Feng and Bodde, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, 20.

<sup>114</sup>Ibid., 45.

<sup>115</sup>Chan and Suen, "Dispute Resolution Management for International Construction Projects in China," 592.

<sup>116</sup>Ibid.

For the Confucians, *dao* was simply the moral path one should follow in life.<sup>117</sup>  *in Daoism was nameless and unnamable; it was the mystical substance that all in the universe originated from.<sup>118</sup> In Daoists literature, discussions of *Dao* never defined what it was; only what it was not.<sup>119</sup> This tradition of following a negative method of description was later reinforced by Buddhism.<sup>120</sup> Another concept of Daoism, was when something approached the extreme, it would return to its opposite.<sup>121</sup> In other words, time is cyclical; the pendulum will always swing in the opposite direction.*

Like Confucianism, Daoism evolved over time. Towards the end of the Han dynasty, in the first century AD, it expanded to include *yin* and *yang* as well as elements of Buddhism.<sup>122</sup> As Buddhism spread through China, Daoism as a religion developed as an indigenous competitor to “the religion of the barbarians.”<sup>123</sup> Over time, it borrowed a great deal from Buddhism, such as rituals, scriptures, and institutions and diverged significantly from neo-Daoism.<sup>124</sup> Religious Daoism looked outward, trying to change or modify nature for human needs, similar to science in the West. Neo-Daoism, known as *xuanxue*, or “dark learning,” developed as an ally of Buddhism with Daoists scholars and Buddhist monks intimate friends and continued to look inward.<sup>125</sup> It also recognized Confucius as a great sage, if not the greatest, and several of the Confucian

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<sup>117</sup>Feng and Bodde, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, 284; Herrlee Glessner Creel, *Chinese Thought, from Confucious to Mao Tse-Tung* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 33.

<sup>118</sup>Feng and Bodde, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, 167.

<sup>119</sup>*Ibid.*, 341.

<sup>120</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>121</sup>*Ibid.*, 97.

<sup>122</sup>*Ibid.*, 211.

<sup>123</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>124</sup>*Ibid.*; James Kern Feibleman, *Understanding Oriental Philosophy: A Popular Account for the Western World* (New York, NY: Horizon Press, 1976), 181.

<sup>125</sup>Feng and Bodde, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, 218; Feibleman, *Understanding Oriental Philosophy: A Popular Account for the Western World*, 181.

classics were reinterpreted using Daoists principles.<sup>126</sup> They also reinterpreted  *as meaning *wu*, literally “nothing.”<sup>127</sup>*

## Buddhism: The Meditation Philosophy

Buddhism was the first external philosophy to be introduced to China. Buddhism was absorbed then evolved into something uniquely Chinese. While Buddha himself was a contemporary of Confucius, Buddhism was not introduced to China until approximately the first century AD. As texts were translated into Chinese, writers used Daoists terminology to explain Buddhist concepts, leading to a synthesis with Daoism. Ultimately this blending resulted in Ch’ an, “meditation,” Buddhism, known in the West by its Japanese name Zen.<sup>128</sup> Ch’ an Buddhism taught that only through meditation could one achieve enlightenment. This enlightenment would come suddenly because, like jumping over a stream, one either succeeded or not. Enlightenment, or achieving Buddhahood, meant to become one with the *Wu*, “Non-being,” or Universal Mind.<sup>129</sup> The best way to prepare for enlightenment was to do one’s everyday tasks without purpose or deliberate effort, in other words live naturally.<sup>130</sup> Once one has achieved enlightenment, one lives just like before only one is different.<sup>131</sup>

## Mao Zedong Thought: Communism Made Uniquely Chinese

Just as Buddhism was a foreign philosophy that evolved into something uniquely Chinese, Communism underwent the same evolution under Mao Zedong. While Mao Zedong

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<sup>126</sup>Feng and Bodde, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, 218; Feibleman, *Understanding Oriental Philosophy: A Popular Account for the Western World*, 183.

<sup>127</sup>Feng and Bodde, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, 221; Feibleman, *Understanding Oriental Philosophy: A Popular Account for the Western World*, 182.

<sup>128</sup>Feng and Bodde, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, 242.

<sup>129</sup>Ibid., 250.

<sup>130</sup>Ibid., 259.

<sup>131</sup>Ibid., 264; Feibleman, *Understanding Oriental Philosophy: A Popular Account for the Western World*, 179.

Thought was Marxist in origin, it was adapted to the agrarian and hierarchical nature of Chinese society. The revolution itself was based on mobilizing the peasantry instead of the urban proletariat. Mao also took steps to break the hold of Confucianism on the people in order to create a fundamental change in Chinese culture from family and clan to a nationalistic orientation.<sup>132</sup> One method was to disrupt filial piety by encouraging children to give evidence against their parents.<sup>133</sup> He also introduced a way of resolving conflict between individuals and the society he was creating, *si xiang gong zuo*, “ideological work.”<sup>134</sup> This method was part of public communication efforts and was used to educate, convince, and criticize the population.<sup>135</sup>

Mao brutally suppressed every traditional Chinese philosophy but also used them to bolster the Communist party. He and his supporters regularly quoted famous Confucians and Daoists philosophers as well as Sun Tzu. Mao took advantage of the hierarchical nature of Chinese society to replace rule by Confucian elite by Communist elite and take his place as a sage-king.<sup>136</sup> According to de Bary, while Mao was openly contemptuous of the traditional philosophies, especially Confucianism, much of the Communist work was Confucian in nature.<sup>137</sup> He points out that when Mao was a student, he studied under the Wang Yang-ming school, the school of the universal mind, of Neo-Confucianism, at that it was possible that Mao drew subconsciously from Confucianism. Li Shaoqui, one of Mao’s principal lieutenants, wrote an article “How to be a Good Communist” that not only espoused the Confucian ideals of self-cultivation and self-discipline but actually referenced them as well.<sup>138</sup> He captures the Neo-

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<sup>132</sup>William Theodore De Bary, *Nobility & Civility: Asian Ideals of Leadership and the Common Good* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 206.

<sup>133</sup>Creel, *Chinese Thought, from Confucious to Mao Tse-Tung*, 253.

<sup>134</sup>Jianglong Wang and Wei Wu, “‘Idealogical Work’ as Conflict Management: A Dialectical Approach in Chinese Communication Campaigns,” *Intercultural Communication Studies VII* 1 (1997-1998): 83.

<sup>135</sup>Ibid., 84-85.

<sup>136</sup>Creel, *Chinese Thought, from Confucious to Mao Tse-Tung*, 254; Feibleman, *Understanding Oriental Philosophy: A Popular Account for the Western World*, 221.

<sup>137</sup>De Bary, *Nobility & Civility: Asian Ideals of Leadership and the Common Good*, 212.

<sup>138</sup>Ibid., 215.

Confucian spirit of a person's responsibility for the common good but he specifies for the party's good.<sup>139</sup> Furthermore, Mao's article "On Contradiction" has overtones of Neo-Daoism, especially the concept of *yin-yang*.<sup>140</sup>

Throughout history, philosophy as a whole has had a very strong influence on Chinese government but which flavor was dominant depended on the times. When Confucianism grew strong and received official state approval, Daoism declined in influence. At times of political or social disorder, when criticism of the status quo was prevalent, Daoism gained favor and Confucianism declined.<sup>141</sup> Neo-Daoism and Buddhism grew in popularity during the Period of Disunity (220-590 AD), Neo-Confucianism was strong in the T'ang dynasty (618-907), Sung (960-1279) and Ming (1368-1643). Regardless of which philosophy was in the forefront, the exam system used throughout Chinese history ensured that philosophy not only impacted each individual through education, but government and politics as well.<sup>142</sup> All the philosophies were generally very tolerant of the others, except for Mao Zedong Though. In the twentieth century, the dominance of Mao Zedong Though was at the expense of all others. But since the death of Mao and the beginning of the Open Door policy, there has been a resurgence of the study of China's ancient philosophies.<sup>143</sup>

These roots of Chinese culture provide the historical backdrop for the five elements that impact Chinese methods of interpersonal conflict management. Each element contains aspects of Chinses culture that are significantly different from the US. While some elements are more important than other, no one element can stand alone without the others. While some researchers, such as Leung and others, doubt the influence of ancient Chinese philosophy, especially Confucianism, on Chinese methods of conflict management, there is significant qualitative

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<sup>139</sup>Ibid., 216.

<sup>140</sup>Wang and Wu, "'Idealogical Work' as Conflict Management," 92.

<sup>141</sup>Feng and Bodde, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, 215-6.

<sup>142</sup>Creel, *Chinese Thought, from Confucious to Mao Tse-Tung*, 159.

<sup>143</sup>Yu, "The Chinese "Native" Perspective on Mao-Dun," 66.

evidence that many Chinese people themselves believe they behave certain ways because of Confucianism.<sup>144</sup> As mentioned before, these elements provide a broad generalization and can vary between different regions, education levels, and socio-economic conditions.

## 和-- *He* (Harmony)

Of all the elements of Chinese culture that impact conflict management, the desire to maintain harmony is perhaps the most overtly referenced.<sup>145</sup> The Chinese word *he* is best translated as “harmony” although the Chinese word has a richer connotation, such as “peace,” “mild,” or “on good terms with each other.”<sup>146</sup> The phrase *renji hexie* is often used to describe interpersonal harmony.<sup>147</sup> According to Leung, and others, “harmony is defined as the glue that links members to the social world.”<sup>148</sup> Sustaining harmonious interpersonal relationships requires following the Confucian *li*; ensuring that social obligations are fulfilled based on one’s social status within one’s *guanxi*.<sup>149</sup> Harmony is essential at all levels of a functioning society. According to Hwang, harmony developed as a strong value because of the agrarian nature of Chinese society and the limited upward mobility of most people.<sup>150</sup> Confucius emphasized *he* but believed that it should be pursued for its own sake not for self-gain or at the expense of more important values such as *ren*, humaneness, or *yi*, righteousness.<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>144</sup>Leung, Koch, and Lu, “A Dualistic Model of Harmony,” 207; Chan and Suen, “Dispute Resolution Management for International Construction Projects in China,” 592; Yu, “The Chinese “Native” Perspective on Mao-Dun,” 66.

<sup>145</sup>Leung, Koch, and Lu, “A Dualistic Model of Harmony,” 202.

<sup>146</sup>Ibid.

<sup>147</sup>Graham and Lam, “The Chinese Negotiation,” 87.

<sup>148</sup>Leung, Koch, and Lu, “A Dualistic Model of Harmony,” 205.

<sup>149</sup>Peter H. Antoniou and Katherine Whitman, “Understanding Chinese Interpersonal Norms and Effective Management of Sino-Western Joint Ventures,” *Multinational Business Review* 6, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 59.

<sup>150</sup>Hwang, “*Guanzi* and *Mientze*: Conflict Resolution in Chinese Society,” 22.

<sup>151</sup>Leung, Koch, and Lu, “A Dualistic Model of Harmony,” 207.

In order to understand how the concept of harmony is used in conflict management, Leung and others define two different motives behind the maintenance of harmony, value perspective and instrumental perspective.<sup>152</sup> The value perspective defines harmony as a goal or a value to be obtained, and behaviors that support this goal are labeled harmony enhancement. People who engage in harmony enhancement are driven by trust and a sincere desire to build the relationship. The instrumental perspective defines harmony as a means to an end or a tool, and behaviors that use harmony as a goal are labeled disintegration avoidance.<sup>153</sup> People who attempt disintegration avoidance are actively avoiding actions that may stress or destroy a relationship and are concerned about the repercussions of those actions.<sup>154</sup>

Harmony is so important to Chinese culture that it takes a long time to determine first impressions. This initial sizing up is known as the non-task sounding.<sup>155</sup> Americans quite often spend only seconds before they form opinions based on their first impressions. A Chinese person, on the other hand, may spend weeks or months on non-task sounding.<sup>156</sup>

The maintenance of harmony is taught at an early age. Studies show that compared to American parents, Chinese parents are more likely to discipline their children for aggression. Methods of punishment include harsh physical punishment, removal of rewards, or social isolation from the family.<sup>157</sup>

There is a significant difference between the Chinese and American perception on the importance of honesty or truthfulness. In Chinese culture, harmony is valued over honesty or

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<sup>152</sup>Ibid.

<sup>153</sup>Ibid.

<sup>154</sup>Ibid.

<sup>155</sup>Anna Stark, Kim-Shyan Fam, David S. Waller, and Zhilong Tian, “Chinese Negotiation Practice: A Perspective from New Zealand Exporters” *Cross Cultural Management* 12, no. 3 (2005): 89.

<sup>156</sup>Graham and Lam, “The Chinese Negotiation,” 87.

<sup>157</sup>Hwang, “Guanzi and Mientze: Conflict Resolution in Chinese Society,” 23.

truthfulness.<sup>158</sup> It is important for a subordinate to publicly agree with a superior to maintain harmony and face even if he or she is in disagreement.<sup>159</sup> According to Dr. Verner Worm and Dr. John Frankenstein, “in China, deception is considered a neutral term and it is acceptable if it embraces ‘the greater good,’ i.e., the well-being of the family or the network...”<sup>160</sup> The military strategist Sun Tzu emphasizes deception and there is no stigma associated with using deception on strangers or out-group members.<sup>161</sup> However, Chinese people are generally honest with people within their in-group.<sup>162</sup>

## 面子 -- *Mianzi* and 脣 -- *Lian* (Face)

Closely related to harmony is *mianzi* and *lian*, or face, the most important element in Chinese conflict management. Face is defined as an individual’s awareness of the public image formed in the minds of others.<sup>163</sup> While face is a universal phenomenon, the characteristics, importance, and functions vary from culture to culture. For an American, face is an internal concept used to define and maintain one’s personal identity and is associated with dignity, prestige, possessions, or job title. In China, face is an external concept used to define and maintain one’s place within a relationship network and encompasses both reputation and social standing.<sup>164</sup> It is a measure of social worth within one’s *guanxi*, social network.<sup>165</sup> The Chinese perception of face is significantly more externally orientated than the American. As a result, a Chinese person will have different face requirements for different settings, such as at work and at

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<sup>158</sup>Verner Worm and John Frankenstein, “The Dilemma of Managerial Cooperation in Sino-Western Business Operations” *Thunderbird International Business Review* 42, no. 3 (May/June 2000): 274-275.

<sup>159</sup>Ibid., 275.

<sup>160</sup>Ibid.

<sup>161</sup>Ibid.

<sup>162</sup>Ibid.

<sup>163</sup>Hwang, “*Guanzi* and *Mientze*: Conflict Resolution in Chinese Society,” 21.

<sup>164</sup>Ibid.; Graham and Lam, “The Chinese Negotiation,” 90.

<sup>165</sup>Ibid.

home. Sources of face include good *guanxi*, wealth, position, intelligence and skills.<sup>166</sup> In China, face is not only tied to a specific person, but to a family, organization, company, or country as well.<sup>167</sup>

Two words in Chinese, *mianzi* and *lian*, are used to describe the group's regard for an individual. While they are often used interchangeably and are interconnected, they have subtly different meanings.<sup>168</sup> According to Hu, *mianzi* is "a reputation achieved through getting on in life, through success and ostentation. This is the prestige that is accumulated by means of personal effort or clever maneuvering."<sup>169</sup> *Lian*, according to Hu, is "the respect of the group for a man with a good moral reputation: the man who will fulfill his obligations regardless of the hardships involved, who under all circumstances shows himself a decent human being."<sup>170</sup>

According to Wenshan Jia, from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, the Chinese concept of face has four characteristics: relational, communal or social, hierarchical, and moral.<sup>171</sup> All four of these characteristics overlap and complement each other thus making it difficult to completely isolate each from the other. These characteristics also apply to both *mianzi* and *lian*, although not equally.

First of all, relationships are critical to both *mianzi* and *lian*. Face is not superficial impression management but reflects a genuine concern for the human connection. Jia summarizes:

[T]he trust, mutual dependence, harmony, forming good feelings, and good human relationships all become ingredients in a generalized notion of human relationship which is connoted by the concept of face. Face is both the goal and the means for strengthening and expressing the harmonization of human relationships among men in society. It is a substitute for strict legislation

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<sup>166</sup>Ibid.

<sup>167</sup>Worm and Frankenstein, "The Dilemma of Managerial Cooperation," 273; Yu, "The Chinese "Native" Perspective on Mao-Dun," 72.

<sup>168</sup>Hsien C. Hu, "The Chinese Concepts of 'Face'" *American Anthropologist* 46 (1944): 45-46.

<sup>169</sup>Ibid., 45.

<sup>170</sup>Ibid.

<sup>171</sup>Jia, "Facework as a Chinese Conflict-Preventive Mechanism," 45.

regarding duties and rights and obligations among men. It is to act from the basic feelings governing human relationships. Thus, any human relationship which appeals to one's feelings of family group or semi-family group will acquire an appeal to influence others and thus count as an element of face (*mianzi*). The larger one's face is, the more integrative the sphere of human relationships he is capable of forging and embracing.<sup>172</sup>

Second, both *mianzi* and *lian* are communal and social. In China, face, especially *lian*, is a communal check against any violations of the norms of society. This aspect of face emphasizes the interdependence of individuals within a group. Since face is defined by the community, an individual who retains or gains face is a full member of the society while one who loses face harms the community and therefore is ostracized.<sup>173</sup> According to Jia, the two Chinese idioms *diou lian*, losing face, and *diou ren*, losing humanity, are interchangeable and therefore demonstrate that having face is being human and part of the community.<sup>174</sup> According to Peter Antoniou and Katherine Whitman, there are four traditional principles that govern social relationships, “the credibility of the individual, the emphasis on the groups, the pivotal role of the leader, and the indebtedness that arises out of interpersonal interaction.”<sup>175</sup> The ideal person must show his or her willingness to cooperate with the group and fulfill both moral obligations and the responsibilities of status.<sup>176</sup> In extreme cases, shame from violating the communal standards caused individuals to commit suicide.<sup>177</sup>

Furthermore, while Americans view face in absolutes, one either has prestige or not, the Chinese think of face in quantitative terms. It is possible to gain or lose small amounts of face at a time.<sup>178</sup> According to Hu, “[*Mianzi*] is built up through initial high position, wealth, power, ability, through cleverly establishing social ties to a number of prominent people, as well as

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<sup>172</sup>Ibid.

<sup>173</sup>Ibid., 46.

<sup>174</sup>Ibid.

<sup>175</sup>Antoniou and Whitman, “Understanding Chinese Interpersonal Norms,” 59.

<sup>176</sup>Ibid.; Hu, “The Chinese Concepts of “Face”,” 45-64.

<sup>177</sup>Ibid.

<sup>178</sup>Graham and Lam, “The Chinese Negotiation,” 90.

through avoidance of acts that would cause unfavorable comment.”<sup>179</sup> *Lian* is more permanent and absolute, one either has morals or does not, but still has gradations.<sup>180</sup>

Another way that face is significantly different for Chinese than Americans concerns the “thickness of skin.” In the US, one is supposed to have relatively “thick skin,” in other words a relatively high tolerance for verbal attacks. One common US childhood phrase encapsulates this concept, “sticks and stones may break my bones but words will never hurt me.” The Chinese value just the opposite. According to Hu, thick skin is “defiance of public censure or disregard for the injunctions of elders trying to impress on the young the moral standards of society.”<sup>181</sup> While it is possible to have skin that is too thin, Chinese society prefers relatively thin skin to thick in order to ensure the individual conforms to communal and social standards.<sup>182</sup>

Third, face is hierarchical. This characteristic of face emphasizes the importance of respect and can be traced to the five relationships defined by Confucianism mentioned previously. Of those relationships, the first four are vertical and only the last, that between friends, is horizontal. How much an individual is concerned with face depends on the position that person has in society as well the position others in their group hold. For example, a peasant in a rural town while interacting with other equal peasants will care little about face. The same peasant will, however, ensure that his or her behavior reflects properly in relation to more senior family members to ensure the family retains face. An elite in society, however, will be concerned about face even among peers.<sup>183</sup> Because of this concern for hierarchical respect, an individual’s behavior requires a degree of indirect communication, depending on the nature of the relationship.<sup>184</sup>

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<sup>179</sup> Hu, “The Chinese Concepts of “Face”,” 61.

<sup>180</sup> Ibid.

<sup>181</sup> Ibid., 54.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid.

<sup>183</sup> Yu, “The Chinese “Native” Perspective on Mao-Dun,” 63-82.

<sup>184</sup> Worm and Frankenstein, “The Dilemma of Managerial Cooperation,” 274.

Finally, face is deeply moral. One's conduct must meet moral and ethical demands according to one's position in society.<sup>185</sup> According to Hu, “*Lian* is both a social sanction for enforcing moral standards and an internalized sanction.”<sup>186</sup> Immoral behavior will result in the loss of *lian*, which will certainly cause a loss of *mianzi*.<sup>187</sup> For example, if the head of an extended family neglects his duties, he places a burden upon his family or the village. Thus the village will question his competence and his character and he will lose *lian*.<sup>188</sup>

In China, face is always important but certain circumstances make face more important than others. Worm and Frankenstein note that face becomes especially important when the same group of people meet regularly; when group identity is developed through cooperative rather than individual efforts; and when criticism of superiors threatens the social order.<sup>189</sup> This defines the Chinese “in-group.” Thus, an individual will be significantly concerned with face within this in-group and behave politely, deferentially, and properly. This same individual may physically fight for a seat on a train at the end of the day with no loss of face.

According to Jia, one of the functions of face is to regulate and punish.<sup>190</sup> Throughout Chinese history, the rule of law has changed based on each new ruler. As a result, society developed a formal set of values based on Confucian propriety and ritual, *li*, that compensated for the vagaries in civil rule. Face became a substitute for strict legislation dictating the duties, rights, and responsibilities of people within the society.<sup>191</sup> According to Jia:

It is precisely due to the lack of the development of legalistic law and due to the Confucian dictum that the rule of propriety (or ritual) governing human society is sufficient for social good, that face talk is developed much more conspicuously

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<sup>185</sup> Hwang, “*Guanzi* and *Mientze*: Conflict Resolution in Chinese Society,” 21.

<sup>186</sup> Hu, “The Chinese Concepts of “Face”,” 45.

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*, 62.

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>189</sup> Worm and Frankenstein, “The Dilemma of Managerial Cooperation,” 273.

<sup>190</sup> Jia, “Facework as a Chinese Conflict-Preventive Mechanism,” 47.

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*

in the Chinese context than in any other context. To use face as a substitute for strict law is based on the belief that human nature is inherently good.<sup>192</sup>

Because of China's historic inability to maintain internal political harmony, the Chinese have “either disdain, distrust or aversion to things political.”<sup>193</sup>

Another function of face is it encourages people to develop into the Confucian sage or gentleman. This ideal person uses education and self-training to develop oneself into the model citizen, one who contributes greatly not just to his or her family but the whole society as well. Striving for good face creates a social pressure to become the best person, both internally and externally, that one can be for the good of society.<sup>194</sup> It is education that separates the elite from the rest of society.<sup>195</sup> Education also is linked to modesty, for only one who does not have self-training tends to boast and is uncaring of others.<sup>196</sup>

There are two examples of face within the international arena. According to Hu:

The appeasement policy of Chamberlain up to the outbreak of [World War II], in the face of Britain's treaty obligations to smaller nations, was felt extremely “lian-losing” in China. To be unwilling to keep promises to weaker nations because of its own interests was neither compatible with its claim to status as the most powerful empire of the world, nor with the desire of the leaders of the nation to be termed gentlemen.<sup>197</sup>

Another, more recent example involves a collision between an American EP-3 and a Chinese F-8 over international waters on 1 April 2001.<sup>198</sup> The American apology was extremely important for internal Chinese consumption. Without it, not only would the family of the Chinese pilot, Wang Wei, lose face, but his flight instructors, his unit, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force,

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<sup>192</sup>Ibid.

<sup>193</sup>Antoniou and Whitman, “Understanding Chinese Interpersonal Norms,” 53.

<sup>194</sup>Jia, “Facework as a Chinese Conflict-Preventive Mechanism,” 47.

<sup>195</sup>Yu, “The Chinese “Native” Perspective on Mao-Dun,” 69.

<sup>196</sup>Hu, “The Chinese Concepts of “Face”,” 49.

<sup>197</sup>Ibid., 48.

<sup>198</sup>See Appendix B for timeline and more details concerning the incident.

as well as the People's Republic of China (PRC) would lose face as well.<sup>199</sup> The situation was particularly critical for Chinese President Jiang Zemin. After the Belgrade embassy bombing, he was criticized for being too soft with the US, especially from the hawkish PLA.<sup>200</sup> US President George W. Bush was relatively new in office and was also pressured to hold strong against China.<sup>201</sup> The situation was resolved when the US Ambassador to China delivered a letter expressing regret over the incident. The letter, when translated into Chinese, sounded more apologetic than in English, allowing President Zemin to deliver an apology to the Chinese, while President Bush appeared to hold the line and save face for Americans.<sup>202</sup>

## 關係 *Guanxi* (Personal Connections)

Closely related to *he*, harmony, and *mianzi*, face, is *guanxi* which loosely translates as “relationship” or “connection” but the word implies much more.<sup>203</sup> *Guanxi* refers to one’s personal network of family, friends, coworkers, and associates.<sup>204</sup> It is a complex web of social connections.<sup>205</sup> *Guanxi* contains an element of reciprocal obligations and trust where relationships are expected to last for years if not a lifetime.<sup>206</sup> *He* and *mianzi* are essential in the maintenance of good *guanxi*, which is important because without good *guanxi*, one may not be able to obtain a good job, attend school, or succeed in life.

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<sup>199</sup> Rebecca MacKinnon, “New Clues to China’s Military Posture,” [Article on-line], available from <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/04/07/mackinnon.debrief/>; Internet; accessed on 10 March 2007.

<sup>200</sup> Tony Karon, “Wanted: Some Diplomatic Choreography to End China Standoff,” [Article on-line], available from <http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,105006,00.html>; Internet; accessed on 10 March 2007.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid.

<sup>202</sup> Sangwon Suh, “About Face,” [Article on-line], available from <http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,105006,00.html>; Internet; accessed on 10 March 2007; Peter H. Gries and Kaiping Peng, “Culture Clash? Apologies East and West,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 11, no. 30 (2002): 176.

<sup>203</sup> Leung, Koch, and Lu, “A Dualistic Model of Harmony,” 214; Graham and Lam, “The Chinese Negotiation,” 86.

<sup>204</sup> Leung, Koch, and Lu, “A Dualistic Model of Harmony,” 214; Worm and Frankenstein, “The Dilemma of Managerial Cooperation,” 271.

<sup>205</sup> Leung, Koch, and Lu, “A Dualistic Model of Harmony,” 214.

<sup>206</sup> Ibid.; Hwang, “*Guanzi* and *Mientze*: Conflict Resolution in Chinese Society,” 20.

It is through one's *guanxi*, connections, that resources are distributed amongst members of the society. In order to preserve face, one must ensure at least minimal care for all members of one's social group and family, especially for the elderly because of the filial duties owed to parents from children.<sup>207</sup> Maintaining face within one's *guanxi* ensures respect, emotional support, and possibly economic assistance from others in times of need. It is through one's *guanxi* that one is introduced to new people, such as potential business partners, employers, or employees.<sup>208</sup>

Because there is conscious, continuous thought about *guanxi*, there is a strong distinction made between in-group and out-group people.<sup>209</sup> Typically, the treatment of people from the two groups is very different. An in-group person is part of one's *guanxi*. An out-group person is potentially dangerous and there is little interpersonal trust among strangers.<sup>210</sup> The Chinese saying, "do not talk too deep when you are not close enough with the other," encapsulates this concept.<sup>211</sup> Furthermore, studies have found that when compared to Americans, the Chinese were less likely to sue a friend, but more likely to sue a stranger.<sup>212</sup> Mao Zedong referred to antagonistic contradictions between China and its enemies and non-antagonistic contradictions within the ranks of the Chinese people in several articles, clearly placing the line between in and out-groups.<sup>213</sup> With individuals, these groups are not necessarily fixed in stone. It is possible through time and effort for an out-group person to become an in-group person. If a conflict is not managed properly, it is possible for an in-group relationship to sour to an out-group relationship.

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<sup>207</sup>Jia, "Facework as a Chinese Conflict-Preventive Mechanism," 47.

<sup>208</sup>Graham and Lam, "The Chinese Negotiation," 86.

<sup>209</sup>Worm and Frankenstein, "The Dilemma of Managerial Cooperation," 269.

<sup>210</sup>Ibid.

<sup>211</sup>Hwang, "Guanzi and Mientze: Conflict Resolution in Chinese Society," 27.

<sup>212</sup>Leung, Koch, and Lu, "A Dualistic Model of Harmony," 209.

<sup>213</sup>Mao Zedong, "On Contradiction"; Mao Zedong, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People," [Archive on-line]. available from <http://www.e-text.org/Politics/MIM/wim/onhandling.html>; Internet; accessed on 4 February 2007.

Because *mianzi* and *lian*, face, are used within one's *guanxi* to enforce individual and group behavior, contracts and other legal guidelines are not as highly regarded as in the US.<sup>214</sup> In business relations, most Chinese do not comprehend Americans' haste to complete a deal. For them, to attempt any agreement without forming the appropriate *renji hexie*, interpersonal harmony, is considered rude.<sup>215</sup> Furthermore, the quality of the relationship between business partners is far more important than a formal contract because contracts are expected to change as conditions change over time.<sup>216</sup> According to Dr. Min Chen, "the goal [during contract negotiations] is to establish areas of mutual interest and to determine commitment. If the unforeseen should arise, "good faith" comes in to play, and judgments based on prior negotiations can be changed."<sup>217</sup>

There are four drawbacks to this system. First, if one party leaves the partner organization, the relationship between the organizations collapses.<sup>218</sup> If, for instance, the US military develops closer ties with the Chinese military and forms long-term coalition operations, there may be problems as US personnel rotate out every six months to one year to be replaced by complete strangers. The second drawback is *guanxi* sometimes leads to a tolerance of corruption and backdoor policies.<sup>219</sup> The third drawback is that intense group cohesiveness can suppress all dissent, leading to "group-think;" a phenomenon widely acknowledged in the US military as a hindrance to good strategic thinking and planning.<sup>220</sup> Finally, informal hand-shake agreements over formal, written documents can lead to misunderstandings.<sup>221</sup>

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<sup>214</sup>Min Chen, "Understanding Chinese and Japanese Negotiating Styles," *The International Executive* (1986-1998) 35, no. 2 (March/April 1993): 148; Graham and Lam, "The Chinese Negotiation," 88.

<sup>215</sup>*Ibid.*, 87.

<sup>216</sup>*Ibid.*, 88; Chen, "Understanding Chinese and Japanese Negotiating Styles," 149.

<sup>217</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>218</sup>Oliver Yau and Sarah Powell, "SPOTLIGHT: Management Styles in the West and East," *Management Decision* 42, no. 5/6 (2004): 808.

<sup>219</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>220</sup>Leung, Koch, and Lu, "A Dualistic Model of Harmony," 209.

<sup>221</sup>Stark et al., "Chinese Negotiation Practice: A Perspective from New Zealand Exporters," 96.

Just as harmony can be viewed through two different motivations, each relationship within one's *guanxi* can be categorized as expressive, instrumental, or a combination.<sup>222</sup> The expressive component of a relationship represents the affective attachment between the two parties. On the other hand, the instrumental component indicates how much of the relationship exists to obtain resources from the other.<sup>223</sup> Most relationships fall in the mixed category but tend towards one extreme or the other and effect methods of conflict management.

The concept of *guanxi* is not unknown within the US military, especially in the officer corps. One of the often stated but unwritten benefits of attending Professional Military Education (PME) schools in residence is the network created with peers. Informally mentoring younger officers not only educates the next generation but also gives the senior officer a pool of younger officers to pull from in later years. For example, the ability of a general officer to fill a position by making a "by name request" gives credibility to the phrase, "it's not what you know, but who you know that is important."<sup>224</sup>

### **社會等級-- *Shehui dengji* (Social Status)**

Within one's *guanxi*, each person has *shehui dengji*, or social status. The type of relationship as well as conflict management style is dependent on the relative rank between the two individuals. A person's social status can be dependent on the position within the family, social status of the family, education, and cultivation to name a few. It is education that separates

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<sup>222</sup>Hwang, "Guanzi and Mientze: Conflict Resolution in Chinese Society," 19-20.

<sup>223</sup>Ibid.

<sup>224</sup>Air Force Personnel Center, "What is a By Name Request (BNR) as it applies to a rated officer filling a rated staff position?" [Database on-line], available from [http://gum.afpc.randolph.af.mil/cgi-bin/askafpc.cgi/php/enduser/std\\_adp.php?p\\_faqid=6311&p\\_created=1140096610&p\\_sid=4kll6Exi&p\\_accessibility=0&p\\_lva=&p\\_sp=cF9zcmNoPTEmcF9zb3J0X2J5PSZwX2dyaWRzb3J0PSZwX3Jvd19jbnQ9MyZwX3Byb2RzPSZwX2NhdHM9JnBfcHY9JnBfcY3Y9JnBfcGFnZT0xJnBfc2VhcmNoX3RleHQ9Qk5S&p\\_li=&p\\_topview=1](http://gum.afpc.randolph.af.mil/cgi-bin/askafpc.cgi/php/enduser/std_adp.php?p_faqid=6311&p_created=1140096610&p_sid=4kll6Exi&p_accessibility=0&p_lva=&p_sp=cF9zcmNoPTEmcF9zb3J0X2J5PSZwX2dyaWRzb3J0PSZwX3Jvd19jbnQ9MyZwX3Byb2RzPSZwX2NhdHM9JnBfcHY9JnBfcY3Y9JnBfcGFnZT0xJnBfc2VhcmNoX3RleHQ9Qk5S&p_li=&p_topview=1); Internet; accessed on 26 March 2007.

the elite from the rest of the population.<sup>225</sup> The higher the education level, the greater status and the greater the concern for face.

The expressive component mentioned in the previous section represents the Confucian ideal of *ren*, benevolence.<sup>226</sup> The closer the relationship, the greater the *ren*. For example, it is acceptable for a supervisor to give a bonus to one employees and not another one based solely on friendship not performance.<sup>227</sup>

Chinese interpersonal relationships fall into one of three categories, vertical in-group, horizontal in-group, or horizontal out-group.<sup>228</sup> Traditionally, of the Confucian five cardinal relationships, four are vertical in-group while the last, friend to friend, is horizontal in-group. Each of the five relationships has specific *li* associated with them, giving the Chinese a very formal society, by American standards.<sup>229</sup> However, now the husband-wife relationship can be a horizontal relationship, depending on the couple desires, changing the traditional standards of propriety.<sup>230</sup> Hwang theorizes that it is now possible for a Chinese individual to construct any relationship in a horizontal or vertical way, depending on the situation.<sup>231</sup> However, once the in-group or out-group and horizontal or vertical nature of the relationship has been established, the *li* for that type of relationship will be followed.<sup>232</sup> According to Daniel Z. Ding, Assistant Professor in the Department of Marketing at City University of Hong Kong, “respect for hierarchy and large power distance implies that the preference for a particular conflict management style can depend on the individual’s relative status in the social hierarchy.”<sup>233</sup>

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<sup>225</sup>Yu, “The Chinese “Native” Perspective on Mao-Dun,” 69.

<sup>226</sup>Hwang, “*Guanzi* and *Mientze*: Conflict Resolution in Chinese Society,” 19.

<sup>227</sup>Tjosvold and Sun, “Understanding Conflict Avoidance,” 151.

<sup>228</sup>Hwang, “*Guanzi* and *Mientze*: Conflict Resolution in Chinese Society,” 24.

<sup>229</sup>Graham and Lam, “The Chinese Negotiation,” 84, 87.

<sup>230</sup>Hwang, “*Guanzi* and *Mientze*: Conflict Resolution in Chinese Society,” 26.

<sup>231</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>232</sup>*Ibid.*, 19.

<sup>233</sup>Ding, “Exploring Chinese Conflict Management Styles,” 45.

In recent times, of the five cardinal Confucian relationships, the one that has suffered the most is the one between parent and child.<sup>234</sup> It is difficult to determine if this is due to Mao's influence or changing socio-economic conditions. Youth have greater access education and women have increased legal rights and access to employment.<sup>235</sup> As a result, parents may have little influence in the choice of a marriage partner or spending priorities.<sup>236</sup> Furthermore, youth are no longer turning to their parents or elders to assist with conflict resolution.<sup>237</sup> One element that has not changed, however, is the primary position of the parents in a person's *guanxi* network.<sup>238</sup> A person will work hard to ensure his or her parents are supported during their later years.<sup>239</sup>

### **整体观念-- *Zhengti guannian* (Holistic Thinking)**

Along with harmony, face, *guanxi*, and social status another characteristic of Chinese culture that impacts conflict management is *zhengti guannian*, holistic thinking.<sup>240</sup> When considering *mao-dun* within its whole context, other aspects include *chiku nailao*, endurance, *chong chang ji yi*, planning for the long run, and *ren*, forbearance.

As mentioned in chapter 1, the Chinese written language combined with the Daoists philosophy encourages people to think holistically. They avoid separating issues from the wider context.<sup>241</sup> Americans like to break complex tasks into smaller segments and measure progress linearly.<sup>242</sup> In business negotiations, Americans will discuss smaller issues such as price, quantity, delivery, quality, and so on; and as each issue is settled, will mentally check that item off the

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<sup>234</sup> Hwang, “*Guanzi* and *Mientze*: Conflict Resolution in Chinese Society,” 22.

<sup>235</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>236</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>237</sup> Yu, “The Chinese “Native” Perspective on Mao-Dun,” 76.

<sup>238</sup> Hwang, “*Guanzi* and *Mientze*: Conflict Resolution in Chinese Society,” 22.

<sup>239</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>240</sup> Graham and Lam, “The Chinese Negotiation,” 89.

<sup>241</sup> Ding, “Exploring Chinese Conflict Management Styles,” 50.

<sup>242</sup> Graham and Lam, “The Chinese Negotiation,” 89.

checklist. The Chinese, on the other hand, with change from one issue to another in an apparently random order and will try to discuss multiple issues at once.<sup>243</sup> During an interview for a study conducted by Xuejian Yu from Stonehill College, an interviewee stated:

We Chinese emphasize the importance of the *zhengti* (the whole) and de-emphasize the individual. Individual interests are important, but they should be balanced with the interests of the whole. If a person overemphasizes his or her own interests without considering the interests of the group, she or he may end up with saving the small only to lose the big. We should be more concerned with the big face instead of the small face of an individual.<sup>244</sup>

Holistic thinking is emphasized in Chinese military theory as well. The *Seven Military Classics* reflect holistic thinking by placing the military within the context of the situation including the Chinese government, people, economy, and enemy.<sup>245</sup> Sun-Tzu, the first military philosopher presented in the *Seven Military Classics* and the most famous of Chinese strategists, advocated prosecuting war within the context of the situation. According to Brigadier General Griffith, “Sun-Tzu was well aware that combat involves a great deal more than the collision of armed men. He considered the moral, intellectual, and circumstantial elements of war to be more important than the physical, and cautioned kings and commanders not to place reliance on sheer military power.”<sup>246</sup> Furthermore, Sun-Tzu believed that the primary target of deception was the mind of the enemy commander.<sup>247</sup> Another military commander from the ninth-century, Wang Chen, wrote in *The Tao of War*, “by accumulating the small, one attains the great, that from the near, one reaches the distant, just like patiently following the river’s flow to a destination. If you seek things too fervently, you will be entangled by a desire for quickness.”<sup>248</sup> Quotes from other

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<sup>243</sup>Ibid.

<sup>244</sup>Yu, “The Chinese “Native” Perspective on Mao-Dun,” 69.

<sup>245</sup>Ralph Sawyer, Mei-chün Sawyer, and Pin Sun, *The Art of the Warrior: Leadership and Strategy from the Chinese Military Classics: With Selections from the Seven Military Classics of Ancient China and Sun Bin's Military Methods*, 1st ed. (Boston: Shambhala, 1996), 79-87, 123-125, 225-234.

<sup>246</sup>Sunzi and Samuel B. Griffith, *The Art of War* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1971), x.

<sup>247</sup>Ibid., 41.

<sup>248</sup>Ralph D. Sawyer, Mei-chün Sawyer, and Zhen Wang, *The Tao of War: The Martial Tao Te Ching*, Pbk.d ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003), 67.

books in the *Seven Military Classics* also support this. “An army that is unable to discern good fortune and misfortune in the as-yet-unformed does not understand preparations,” from *Military Methods*; “one who abandons what is nearby to plan for what is distant will labor without success.” from *Huang Shih-kung*; “being victorious in battle is easy, but preserving the results of victory is difficult,” from *Wu-tzu*; “strategic power is exercised in accord with the enemy’s movements. Changes stem from the confrontation between the two armies. Unorthodox and orthodox tactic are produced from the inexhaustible resources of the mind,” from the *Six Secret Teachings*.<sup>249</sup>

Within holistic thinking lies the concept of *chiku nailao*. When translated into English it means endurance, relentless, to labor, or, literally, to eat bitterness.<sup>250</sup> In other words, the Chinese are willing to make significant sacrifices in the short term in order to obtain benefits in the long term. A well known example of this honored quality was how Mao Zedong and his people endured eight months of hardship and deprivation through out the Long March during the Chinese revolution.<sup>251</sup> When a superior requests a subordinate to accomplish a task, the latter usually has no choice. If the subordinate has other goals that conflict with the superior’s task, the subordinate may decide to practice *chiku nailao* and give up the personal goal.<sup>252</sup>

Closely related to *chiku nailao* within the context of holistic thinking is *chong chang ji yi*, planning for the long run.<sup>253</sup> The agrarian roots of Chinese culture encourage long-term planning and most *guanxi* relationships last a lifetime.<sup>254</sup> A common Chinese saying captures this concept, “if you want to be a taker, you must begin with being a giver.”<sup>255</sup> Thinking in these terms also goes hand-in-hand with the concept of *jiejian*, thrift. Chinese families save almost four times

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<sup>249</sup> Sawyer, Sawyer, and Sun, *The Art of the Warrior: Leadership and Strategy from the Chinese Military Classics*, 8, 91, 77, 75, 101.

<sup>250</sup> Graham and Lam, “The Chinese Negotiation,” 90.

<sup>251</sup> Ibid.

<sup>252</sup> Hwang, “*Guanzi* and *Mientze*: Conflict Resolution in Chinese Society,” 26.

<sup>253</sup> Ding, “Exploring Chinese Conflict Management Styles,” 49.

<sup>254</sup> Ibid., 46.

<sup>255</sup> Ibid.

more of their income than do American families.<sup>256</sup> This also leads the hard bargaining over prices through haggling.<sup>257</sup>

The last aspect of holistic thinking is that of *ren*, forbearance. According to Hwang, “in its broadest sense, forbearance means to control and to suppress one's emotion, desire, and psychological impulse.”<sup>258</sup> There is another aspect of *ren*, *jian-ren* which means perseverance or “to obviate all difficulties to attain one's final goal.”<sup>259</sup> This concept is similar to *chiku nailao*.

The significant difference between Chinese holistic thought focused on consequences and American analytical reasoning focused on culpability was highlighted during the 2001 EP-3 incident.<sup>260</sup> Americans viewed the incident in isolation, thus the more maneuverable fighter was the single cause of the accident and at fault.<sup>261</sup> The Chinese, on the other hand, viewed the accident with a wider lens. President George W. Bush had recently labeled China a competitor, he was advocating a National Missile Defense program, the US increased the number of surveillance flights, and this event followed closely after the 1999 Embassy bombing in Belgrade.<sup>262</sup> Furthermore, it was a Chinese, not American, pilot who died. Thus to the Chinese, the US looked like a bully.<sup>263</sup> If the EP-3 had not been there in the first place, the accident would not have occurred.

Over the last 3,000 years, the Chinese have developed a rich and diverse culture. They have generated a different solution set to the question of survival than the US, developing different behaviors and values. Through the centuries, the Chinese have seen governments come and go, but the people remained tied to their land and large-scale irrigation projects. This fostered the importance of interpersonal relationships over strict rule of law and led to the perception that

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<sup>256</sup>Graham and Lam, “The Chinese Negotiation,” 89.

<sup>257</sup>Ibid., 90.

<sup>258</sup>Hwang, “*Guanzi* and *Mientze*: Conflict Resolution in Chinese Society,” 26.

<sup>259</sup>Ibid.

<sup>260</sup>See Appendix B for timeline and more details.

<sup>261</sup>Gries and Peng, “Culture Clash? Apologies East and West,” 175.

<sup>262</sup>In China, a competitor is a rival or enemy, there is no “friendly” competition. Ibid.

<sup>263</sup>Ibid.

“the Chinese trust in only two things: their families and their bank accounts.”<sup>264</sup> These ties between people have been strengthened over the years by both the philosophies and religions of Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism, and Mao Zedong thought.

Of the five elements of Chinese culture, *mianzi* and *lian* (face) have the most impact on conflict management behavior choices. The other four elements, *he* (harmony), *guanxi* (personal connections), *shehui dengji* (social status), and *zhengti guannian* (holistic thinking) also have an impact and cannot be ignored. These cultural fundamentals give rise to methods of conflict management that differ from American styles.

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<sup>264</sup>Graham and Lam, “The Chinese Negotiation,” 85.

## CHAPTER 5: Chinese Methods of Conflict Management

Chinese styles of interpersonal conflict management are similar to American in many ways, but where they differ, the contrast can be extreme. Most of the differences can be attributed to the cultural and historical differences outlined in chapters 2 and 4. In other words, culture matters a great deal. For the Chinese, the nature of the conflict as well as the nature of the relationship determines the style of conflict management. This chapter will first outline the dual harmony model, a model that incorporates harmony and is designed to use in conjunction with the traditional American dual concern model. The dual concern model will then be revisited; expanding and modifying the definitions as necessary to incorporate the cultural elements presented in chapter 4 and reflect the differences between relationship types. Recently Ting-Toomey, Oetzel, and Yee-Jung identified three additional categories of Chinese conflict management: neglect, emotional expression, and third-party involvement.<sup>265</sup> The first, neglect, is included within the revised definition of avoidance within the dual concern model. The second, emotional expression, is included within the dual harmony model. The last category, third-party involvement, is presented here as a separate style of conflict management. In addition to the three methods of conflict management, facework, which covers a much broader area than just conflict management, is presented due to the importance of preserving one's public image.


While conflict is viewed as potentially useful in the US, in Chinese culture, *mao-dun* is still regarded negatively as something destructive, despite Mao's insistence that *mao-dun* is unavoidable.<sup>266</sup> The traditional view is to make big *mao-dun* into small *mao-dun* and small *mao-*

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<sup>265</sup> Stella Ting-Toomey, John G. Oetzel, and Kimberlie Yee-Jung, "Self-Construal Types and Conflict Management Styles," *Communication Reports* 14, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 89; John G. Oetzel and Stella Ting-Toomey, *Managing Intercultural Conflict Effectively* (Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage Publications, 2001), 47.

<sup>266</sup> Yu, "The Chinese "Native" Perspective on Mao-Dun," 66.

*dun* into no *mao-dun*.<sup>267</sup> Thus, if one can make the problem disappear, there is no longer a problem to solve.<sup>268</sup>



**Figure 2: Dual Harmony Model**

*Source:* Kwon Leung, Pamela Tremain Koch, and Lin Lu. "A Dualistic Model of Harmony and its Implications for Conflict Management in Asia," *Asia Pacific Journal of Management* 19, no. 2,3 (August 2002): 212. NOTE: The dual harmony model where value harmony, concern for the quality of harmony within the relationship, is plotted against instrumental harmony, concern for the relationship in order to obtain a resource or goal.

### **Dual Harmony Model: An Expansion of the Dual Concern Model**

As shown in chapter 3, the dual concern model of conflict management presents an incomplete model of Chinese methods of conflict management. In order to include the cultural values of long-range outlook and group context, Leung, Konch and Lu developed the dual

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<sup>267</sup>Ibid., 71.

<sup>268</sup>Yau and Powell, "SPOTLIGHT: Management Styles in the West and East," 809.

harmony model.<sup>269</sup> They theorize that instrumental and value harmony can be plotted against each other to describe how Chinese manage conflict as shown in Figure 2.<sup>270</sup> According to Leung and others, “instrumental harmony” is different than “concern for self” in that the latter is focused on maximizing self-gain while the former is focused on using a conflict-free relationship to obtain a resource or goal.<sup>271</sup> They emphasize that the dual harmony model does not replace the dual concern model, but supplements it because there are circumstances when the dual concern model is appropriate. This model also suggests that open debate and disagreement guided by genuine concern for harmony can be beneficial for conflict management.<sup>272</sup>

When value harmony was plotted against instrumental, Leung found four conflict management styles: aligning, smoothing, balancing, and disintegrating, as shown in Figure 2. The aligning category emphasizes overt behaviors that generate harmony as a value into itself.<sup>273</sup> The smoothing category is Machiavellian in nature where the use of the relationship is justified by the obtainment of a resource or goal.<sup>274</sup> The balancing style attempts to pursue harmony for its own sake as well as conflict-free relationship to obtain a goal or resource.<sup>275</sup> The disintegrating category reflects a total disregard for the connection between self and others.<sup>276</sup> Table 2 lists specific conflict behaviors for each category.

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<sup>269</sup>Leung, Koch, and Lu, “A Dualistic Model of Harmony,” 211.

<sup>270</sup>Ibid., 211-212.

<sup>271</sup>Ibid., 210.

<sup>272</sup>Ibid., 215.

<sup>273</sup>Ibid., 212.

<sup>274</sup>Ibid.

<sup>275</sup>Ibid., 212-213

<sup>276</sup>Ibid., 213.

**Table 2: The dual harmony model with interests and behaviors for each category.**

<b>Conflict style</b>	<b>Aligning</b> High value harmony Low instrumental harmony	<b>Smoothing</b> Low value harmony High instrumental harmony	<b>Balancing</b> High value harmony High instrumental harmony	<b>Disintegrating</b> Low value harmony Low instrumental harmony
<b>Interest</b>	Concern for both	Concern for self	Concern for both	Not definite
<b>Behavioral syndrome</b>	Harmony enhancement	Disintegration avoidance	Harmony enhancement and disintegration avoidance	Total negligence of relational issues
<b>Specific conflict behaviors</b>	Problem solving; constructive confrontation; direct, respectful communication; building feelings of intimacy; compatible and mutually beneficial behavior	Strong preference for conflict avoidance; obey publicly while defying privately; severance; avoid communication; hidden competitive behaviors; indirect communication endurance, mediation; giving or protecting face	Problem solving; constructive confrontation; direct and indirect communication; building feelings of intimacy; compatible and mutually beneficial behavior; compromise; endurance, mediation; giving or protecting face	No attempt to promote positive interpersonal relationships

*Source:* Kwon Leung, Pamela Tremain Koch, and Lin Lu. "A Dualistic Model of Harmony and its Implications for Conflict Management in Asia," *Asia Pacific Journal of Management* 19, no. 2,3 (August 2002):

There are several advantages and one disadvantage with this model. First, it gives more definition and breadth to the avoiding category of the dual concern model. Depending on the circumstances, behavior under three of the four dual harmony categories could be considered avoidance behavior according to the dual concern model. The dual harmony model adds to avoidance behavior a way to determine intentions and potential future behavior. While it was developed with the Chinese methods of conflict management in mind, it could be useful for explaining some conflict situations in the US that the dual concern model does not cover well, such as conflict within a family or other groups where personal relationships last a long time. The disadvantage of this model is it does not take into consideration the nature of the relationship, thus a conflict situation could change between two categories depending on whether the relationship was in-group horizontal or in-group vertical.

### **Chinese Adaptations of the Dual Concern Model**

There have been several quantitative and qualitative studies that focus on the application of the dual concern model in Chinese society. While all of the sub-categories identified by the

dual concern model are used within China, they are applicable only in certain types of relationships or situations. Thus, this section expands and modifies the definitions of the five dual concern styles from chapter 3 in order to reflect the Chinese cultural values discussed in chapter 4. Within each category, the differences between vertical in-group, horizontal in-group, and out-group are explored.

## Competitive

Both quantitative and qualitative studies show the Chinese least prefer the domination, competitive style. When this style is used, it is used with extreme caution and care and only under specific conditions.<sup>277</sup> Over the past several decades, individuals in China have increased their use of this strategy.<sup>278</sup> This is attributable to three factors the encouragement from Mao Zedong to openly criticize others for incorrect thoughts or actions, modernization, and more recently globalization leading to increased individualism.<sup>279</sup>

Vertical in-group. Due to the hierarchical nature of Chinese society, the only time a person would consider using a competitive or dominating style of conflict management within a vertical in-group relationship would be from the position of higher social status. The greater the power distance between the individuals, the greater the expected domination of the higher over the lower. Thus, it is expected that a senior government official will have significant power over the masses and lower individuals will follow the *li*, the rules of propriety.

When a subordinate engages in behavior the supervisor disagrees with or even just makes a mistake, a Chinese manager will use shame against the subordinate.<sup>280</sup> Shame is used as a social

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<sup>277</sup>Ding, “Exploring Chinese Conflict Management Styles,” 47.

<sup>278</sup>Yu, “The Chinese “Native” Perspective on Mao-Dun,” 73-74.

<sup>279</sup>Ibid., 74.

<sup>280</sup>Catherine H. Tinsley and Elizabeth Weldon, “Responses to a Normative Conflict among African American and Chinese Managers,” *International Journal of Cross Cultural Management: CCM* 3, no. 2 (August 2003): 189.

control, to teach a moral lesson, and to motivate the individual to follow *li*.<sup>281</sup> This lesson causes the transgressor to fear social rejection within the collectivist society and work towards retaining or regaining the respect of others.<sup>282</sup>

Horizontal in-group. The use of competitive or dominating behavior is very difficult within a horizontal in-group relationship and requires great care and thought. In a qualitative study conducted by Daniel Z. Ding, all Chinese managers interviewed believed that within a joint venture, one party would not be able to pursue its own goals to the other's expense without damaging the relationship.<sup>283</sup> When asked what conditions would cause their use of this method of conflict management, the responses were:

1. When their position was correct and request was reasonable.
2. When the goal was of critical importance to China or the Chinese party.
3. When the perceived cost to the other party was low<sup>284</sup>

Thus, the best Chinese term to describe this method is *ju li li zheng*, “striving for the best of your interests if your position is correct and reasonable.”<sup>285</sup> Under these conditions, it is possible for family members, friends, or co-workers to be aggressive and confrontational.<sup>286</sup>

If the subordinate in a vertical in-group relationship feels the superior is ignoring his or her concerns, the inferior may force a conflict to attempt to move the relationship from vertical to horizontal.<sup>287</sup> By forcing a relationship change, the rules of *li* change, and both parties may be able to move to a more productive method of conflict management.<sup>288</sup> In order for this approach to be successful, the power distance must be relatively small and the superior must be at least open to the possibility of change. An example of this situation is when the victim of spousal

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<sup>281</sup>Ibid., 185.

<sup>282</sup>Ibid.

<sup>283</sup>Ding, “Exploring Chinese Conflict Management Styles,” 47.

<sup>284</sup>Ibid.

<sup>285</sup>Ibid.

<sup>286</sup>Yu, “The Chinese “Native” Perspective on Mao-Dun,” 72.

<sup>287</sup>Hwang, “*Guanzi* and *Mientze*: Conflict Resolution in Chinese Society,” 27-28.

<sup>288</sup>Ibid.

abuse fights back or obtains a divorce.<sup>289</sup> Another possible example is the current tensions between China and North Korea. In the past, China has been the superior in the vertical relationship. It is possible that one of the goals behind North Korea's recent actions, such as the nuclear weapon test, has been to move the relationship between them and China to a more horizontal relationship. China's immediate response characterizing North Korea as *hanran*, brazen, a term usually reserved for enemies, could be seen as a move to force the relationship back vertically.<sup>290</sup>

Out-group. Chinese aggressive and dominating behavior towards out-group members can be very confrontational and sometimes violent.<sup>291</sup> Chinese are more likely to sue a stranger but less likely to sue a friend than Americans.<sup>292</sup> The parliament in Taiwan is extremely adversarial; questions from opposition legislators tended to blame or criticize. Some responses were defensive or conciliatory following *li*, appropriate behavior, but some responses were counter-accusations conveyed by sarcasm.<sup>293</sup> Historically, China has not hesitated to push military power into neighboring territories. For example, Vietnam was under Chinese control from 208 BC to AD 939, a tributary state from AD 967 until 1287, conquered in the early 1400s then freed again in 1426 during the Ming dynasty, and an aborted attack in 1788 and 1979.<sup>294</sup> It is not uncommon for physical fights to occur between strangers.<sup>295</sup> For example, as told by one interviewee:

If you go to public places, you will often see people get into fights over trivial matters. For example, on a bus or in a train, you can see people be nasty to each other over a seat or a luggage space. The confrontation can vary from verbal

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<sup>289</sup>Ibid., 28.

<sup>290</sup>Mark Magnier, "North Korean Threat Different for China," [Article on-line], available from <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/earlybird/Oct2006/e20061013461475.html>; Internet; accessed 13 October 2006.

<sup>291</sup>Hwang, "Guanzi and Mientze: Conflict Resolution in Chinese Society," 33.

<sup>292</sup>Leung, Koch, and Lu, "A Dualistic Model of Harmony," 209.

<sup>293</sup>Hwang, "Guanzi and Mientze: Conflict Resolution in Chinese Society," 33.

<sup>294</sup>Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History*, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1997), 111, 113, 115, 116, 701.

<sup>295</sup>Yu, "The Chinese "Native" Perspective on Mao-Dun," 73.

attack to physical assault. You can see peddlers fight over display space or place.<sup>296</sup>

Mao Zedong referred to out-group *mao-dun* between China and its enemies as antagonistic in nature.<sup>297</sup> He emphasized that in order to resolve *mao-dun* of this nature, it was essential to draw a clear distinction between China and the enemy.<sup>298</sup> The enemies Mao specifically mentions in his 1957 article “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions” include Japan and US imperialists as well as Chinese traitors, reactionary elements, and counter-revolutionaries.<sup>299</sup> This categorization justifies treating Chinese individuals who otherwise would have been more protected by society as out-group members.

## Accommodating

The use of this style of conflict management is so different between the relationship types that it is not possible to provide any overall trends. The Chinese will not generally accommodate strangers or out-group members because there is no collective good to consider, like in the case with a vertical in-group members, and no expected future return, like in the case with a horizontal in-group members.

Vertical in-group. When a subordinate is forced to follow a superior, he or she may choose to practice *chiku nailao*, endurance, and give up the personal goal. Endurance is a common strategy used by young couples to cope with the stress of everyday life.<sup>300</sup> *Ren*, forbearance, is also common advice to young wives dealing with an abusive spouse or dominating in-laws.<sup>301</sup> As stated by Hwang:

[W]hen the victims told their parents how they had suffered [from their abusive husband], their parents usually suggested that women should forbear about that.

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<sup>296</sup>Ibid.

<sup>297</sup>Mao Zedong, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People.”

<sup>298</sup>Ibid.

<sup>299</sup>Ibid.

<sup>300</sup>Hwang, “*Guanzi* and *Mientze*: Conflict Resolution in Chinese Society,” 26.

<sup>301</sup>Ibid., 26.

Their parents-in-laws also gave them similar advice by saying: because their sons had long been like that and would never change. So, it would be better to follow the policy of “opening one eye, with another eye closed.”<sup>302</sup>

Another conflict situation that requires management is that between the individual and the collective. In this situation, the individual is considered the inferior to the collective, usually the Chinese government.<sup>303</sup> Mao Zedong referred to this type of *mao-dun* between the people as non-antagonistic. He emphasized that in order to resolve *mao-dun* of this nature, it was essential to draw a clear distinction between right and wrong.<sup>304</sup> He also stated, “the only way to settle questions of an ideological nature or controversial issues among the people is by the democratic method, the method of discussion, of criticism, of persuasion and education, and not by the method of coercion or repression.”<sup>305</sup> Thus, the concept of *si xiang gong zuo*, ideological work, was created.<sup>306</sup> Originally this campaign was designed to persuade farmers to join the collectives but has been more recently put to use to enforce China’s family planning policies.<sup>307</sup> Through proper ideological work, family planning workers could convince individuals to accommodate the collective’s goals.<sup>308</sup>

Horizontal in-group. Within a horizontal in-group relationship, accommodation is part of maintaining good *guanxi*, personal relations. This style does not necessarily equate to selfless generosity, charity, or self-sacrifice as defined by the dual concern model, but instead enhancing goodwill within a harmonious relationship.<sup>309</sup> Chinese managers or business partners will accommodate the needs or demands of the other party in order to maintain a good relationship.<sup>310</sup>

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<sup>302</sup>Ibid., 27.

<sup>303</sup>Wang and Wu, “‘Ideological Work’ as Conflict Management,” 87.

<sup>304</sup>Mao Zedong, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People.”

<sup>305</sup>Ibid.

<sup>306</sup>Wang and Wu, “‘Ideological Work’ as Conflict Management,” 84.

<sup>307</sup>Ibid., 87.

<sup>308</sup>Ibid.

<sup>309</sup>Irene Hau-siu Chow and Daniel Z. Q. Ding, “Moral Judgement and Conflict Handling Styles among Chinese in Hong Kong and PRC,” *The Journal of Management Development* 21, no. 9/10 (2002): 670.

<sup>310</sup>Ding, “Exploring Chinese Conflict Management Styles,” 48.

Part of *guanxi* is reciprocity; therefore the manager knows that the accommodation will be returned at a later date.

## Compromising

Of all the conflict management styles presented within the dual concern model, the compromising style is the method that retains the most of the original meaning after translation and is used in a very similar way.<sup>311</sup> The only difference between the Chinese perception of this style and the American is that the Chinese place more emphasis on the mutual nature of the approach and the long term nature of the relationship.<sup>312</sup> The goal within this method is the common interests of each side are recognized and a mutually acceptable solution is found. Because one or both side cannot meet their goals entirely, each side is expected to make concessions.<sup>313</sup> The Chinese are very willing to make short-term concessions in order to make long-term gains.<sup>314</sup> This style also retains its meaning across the different relationship types. The greater the power distance within a vertical relationship, the less likely the use of the compromise method of conflict management and the greater the use of dominating-accommodating.

A variation of compromise is *qiu da dong, cun xiao yi*, “seek agreement on principal issues and allow differences in minor issues.” This approach looks at the nature of the conflict, the relative importance in regard to other issues, and the relative importance of the goal.<sup>315</sup> Thus, a person may be more aggressive concerning the major aspects of the conflict than minor issues.<sup>316</sup> This approach was emphasized by Mao Zedong in the essay “On Contradiction,” “[O]ne must not treat all the contradictions in a process as being equal but must distinguish

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<sup>311</sup>Ibid.

<sup>312</sup>Ibid.

<sup>313</sup>Chen, “Understanding Chinese and Japanese Negotiating Styles,” 152; Ding, “Exploring Chinese Conflict Management Styles,” 48.

<sup>314</sup>Ibid., 49.

<sup>315</sup>Ibid.

<sup>316</sup>Ibid.

between the principal and the secondary contradictions, and pay special attention to grasping the principal one.”<sup>317</sup>

## Avoiding

Of all the categories within the dual concern model, the Chinese use of the avoiding style is perhaps the most different from Americans. First, the Chinese have a much more positive opinion concerning avoidance. Second, Chinese avoidance behavior is much more complicated than American, involving different motivations and behaviors. Of these behaviors, one may conform and agree, use stratagem and tactics to achieve one’s goals, or outflank the other party. Regardless of the motivations, the particular avoidance tactic taken is dependent on the quality of the relationship as opposed to the nature of the relationship itself.

According to Dr. Dean Tjosvold, from the Lingnan University in Hong Kong, and Dr. Haifa F. Sun, from Sun Yat-Sen University in China, there are four distinct motivations behind Chinese using the avoidance style of conflict management; reliance, accommodation, sufficiency, and fear of revenge.<sup>318</sup> The reliance motivation exists when one party trusts another. In other words, one party is confident that the other will be helpful and considerate of their goals. The accommodation motivation exists when one wishes to protect the harmony of the relationship and the face of the other party. The sufficiency motivation involves the belief that one can achieve one’s goals by outflanking the other or the other will eventually agree. Lastly, one may avoid conflict out of fear of revenge due to a lack of trust.<sup>319</sup>

Of all the behaviors within the avoidance style, conforming and agreeing most resembles the original definition of avoidance within the dual concern model. In the event that both parties have contradictory goals and are unwilling to give them up, they may use this style to evade an

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<sup>317</sup>Mao Zedong, “On Contradiction.”

<sup>318</sup>Tjosvold and Sun, “Understanding Conflict Avoidance,” 155.

<sup>319</sup>Ibid.

emotional confrontation that could damage the relationship and escalate out of control.<sup>320</sup> If a compromise was not successful, they may decide to postpone the problem for a later date.<sup>321</sup> The parties may withdraw from the confrontation in order to protect face for both.<sup>322</sup> Protagonists may avoid open discussion simply because the point is not important enough, it is possible to solve the problem without discussion, open discussion is too stressful or damages the relationship for other reasons.<sup>323</sup> According to Tjosvold and Sun, the quality of the relationship determines how successful this conflict management style is.<sup>324</sup> If the relationship is strong and stable with confidence in the other party, this method can promote productivity.<sup>325</sup> If the relationship is weak however, this style is counterproductive and damages the relationship further.<sup>326</sup>

Another method of conflict avoidance is known as *yi tui wei jin, yu hui jin ji*, “retreating for the purpose of advancing; pursuing by making a detour.”<sup>327</sup> Part of this method is pretending to obey in public, but privately pursuing one’s goals, also called, “the superior has a policy to impose on, while the inferior has a trick to cope with it.”<sup>328</sup> According to Hwang, this strategy was used throughout history when imperial China attempted to enact policy with little to no concern for the local conditions. This method also makes use of evading tactics or tricks to deal with the other party. Chinese people regularly use the military strategies developed by Sun Tzu in everyday life. The more instrumental the nature of the relationship, the more likely the use of strategic behavior.<sup>329</sup>

The method of outflanking means that one will outwardly conform but will collect information and actively attempt to change the other’s decision using indirect methods. The

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<sup>320</sup>Ding, “Exploring Chinese Conflict Management Styles,” 48.

<sup>321</sup>Chow and Ding, “Moral Judgement and Conflict Handling Styles,” 670.

<sup>322</sup>Tjosvold and Sun, “Understanding Conflict Avoidance,” 152.

<sup>323</sup>Ibid., 145.

<sup>324</sup>Ibid., 155.

<sup>325</sup>Ibid.

<sup>326</sup>Ibid.

<sup>327</sup>Ding, “Exploring Chinese Conflict Management Styles,” 48.

<sup>328</sup>Hwang, “*Guanzi* and *Mientze*: Conflict Resolution in Chinese Society,” 29.

<sup>329</sup>Ibid., 32.

difference between this method of conflict management and mediation or arbitration is the other party in the conflict is unaware of the third party involvement or influence. For example, one may attempt to get a more powerful party or a supervisor to accept and advocate one's position.<sup>330</sup> If a subordinate disagrees with a superior, he or she may ask someone in their *guanxi*, social network, to pass the message to the superior.<sup>331</sup> According to Tjosvold and Sun, outflanking results in more effective solutions to a conflict and stronger relationships than conforming and agreeing.<sup>332</sup>

## Collaborating

Like Americans, the Chinese find the collaborating method of conflict management the most beneficial and attractive approach within the dual concern model.<sup>333</sup> The one difference is the Chinese have a definite concern for a harmonious relationship in addition to the win-win solution.<sup>334</sup> Most people in China recognize that managing conflict in collaboration strengthens the relationship further.<sup>335</sup> The Chinese also recognize that this style may not always be an available option because parties usually have conflicting goals and objectives.<sup>336</sup> Like compromise, this style also retains its meaning across the different relationship types. The greater the power distance within a vertical relationship, the less likely the use of the collaborating method of conflict management and the greater the use of dominating-accommodating.

## Third Party Involvement: A Distinct Chinese Style

One prevalent Chinese method of conflict management that is not addressed by the dual concern model is mediation. The dual harmony list this style under both smoothing and balancing depending on the intent of each party involved. The Chinese are far more apt to involve the

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<sup>330</sup>Tjosvold and Sun, "Understanding Conflict Avoidance," 152, 154.

<sup>331</sup>Hwang, "Guanzi and Mientze: Conflict Resolution in Chinese Society," 27.

<sup>332</sup>Tjosvold and Sun, "Understanding Conflict Avoidance," 152.

<sup>333</sup>Ding, "Exploring Chinese Conflict Management Styles," 49.

<sup>334</sup>Leung, Koch, and Lu, "A Dualistic Model of Harmony," 215.

<sup>335</sup>Tjosvold, Poon, and Yu, "Team Effectiveness in China," 357.

<sup>336</sup>Ding, "Exploring Chinese Conflict Management Styles," 49.

involvement of a third party or a go-between for conflict management than Americans. Normally the third party is a higher ranking member of both people's *guanxi*, social network, who is trusted by both parties and the conflict is kept as close to the family, group, or organization as possible.<sup>337</sup> Sometimes the third party will mediate a conflict without being asked in order to preserve face for the whole group or prevent the conflict from escalating.<sup>338</sup>

To solve conflicts within business ventures, Americans are much more apt to look to legal solutions than the Chinese.<sup>339</sup> Going to court is the last solution for the Chinese because it publicly demonstrates that the two parties were unable to manage their disagreements in a civilized manner.<sup>340</sup> Both sides would lose face and it would be more difficult to form a joint venture in the future.<sup>341</sup> In the event a solution cannot be found, the severance of the relationship must be blame-free.<sup>342</sup>

The use of the third party for conflict resolution has changed over the past several decades. In the past, conflicting parties could go to *ling-dao*, their supervisors or authorities in the group, for arbitration.<sup>343</sup> But now, younger people are more apt to turn to their friends as mediators.<sup>344</sup> Furthermore, while court is still the least preferred method of conflict resolution, the increasing rate of divorce has generated a greater tolerance for legal solutions.<sup>345</sup>

## **Facework: Behaviors to Maintain One's Social Identity**

According to Jia, face in China is not only a social construct but a process as well.<sup>346</sup> While Americans may view the preservation of face as a subcategory of conflict avoidance;

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<sup>337</sup>Yu, "The Chinese 'Native' Perspective on Mao-Dun," 74.

<sup>338</sup>Ibid., 74-75; Hwang, "Guanzi and Mientze: Conflict Resolution in Chinese Society," 33-34.

<sup>339</sup>Chow and Ding, "Moral Judgement and Conflict Handling Styles," 670.

<sup>340</sup>Chen, "Understanding Chinese and Japanese Negotiating Styles," 156.

<sup>341</sup>Ibid.

<sup>342</sup>Ibid., 157.

<sup>343</sup>Yu, "The Chinese 'Native' Perspective on Mao-Dun," 76.

<sup>344</sup>Ibid.

<sup>345</sup>Ibid., 77.

<sup>346</sup>Jia, "Facework as a Chinese Conflict-Preventive Mechanism," 48.

Chinese facework has both active and passive components. Facework is defined as the art of giving and maintaining face and focuses on maintaining one's personal identity within the context of the group.<sup>347</sup> It is a delicate balance of action and inaction, confrontation and avoidance, direct and indirect communication. Successful facework proactively creates harmonious relationships in which conflict is prevented or minimized.<sup>348</sup> According to Oetzel, Ting-Toomey, Yokochi, Masumoto, and Takai, "facework can be distinguished from conflict style in that the former involves specific behavior that focus on a person's (or other's) claimed image as it relates to relational and substantive goals above and beyond the conflict situation, and the latter involves a general pattern of behavior during conflict to address and resolve substantive issues."<sup>349</sup> "Facework is employed to resolve a conflict, exacerbate a conflict, avoid a conflict, threaten or challenge another person's position, protect a person's image, etc."<sup>350</sup> Thus, facework is combination of conflict management styles used in concert over time through a multitude of individual conflicts for the higher goal of gaining or maintaining face.

Combining facework theory with the dual harmony model, Dr. Frances Brew and David Cairns, from Macquarie University Sydney, outlined possible connections between face concerns and conflict and communication styles that may predict when an individual would use a particular style of conflict management, shown in Table 3.<sup>351</sup> One result from this theory is that the Chinese, as collectivists, would not normally employ a disintegrating method of conflict management whereas Americans, as individualists, would not normally employ a smoothing

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<sup>347</sup>Worm and Frankenstein, "The Dilemma of Managerial Cooperation," 272.

<sup>348</sup>Jia, "Facework as a Chinese Conflict-Preventive Mechanism," 49.

<sup>349</sup>John G. Oetzel et al., "A Typology of Facework Behaviors in Conflicts with Best Friends and Relative Strangers," *Communication Quarterly* 48, no. 4 (Fall 2000): 401.

<sup>350</sup>Ibid., 400.

<sup>351</sup>Brew and Cairns, "Styles of Managing Interpersonal Workplace Conflict," 48.

style. This matrix should be used with caution since most conflicts are very situational dependent.<sup>352</sup>

**Table 3: Conflict styles, communication and face concerns.**

		Individualists		Collectivists		
		Instrumental concern	Relational concern	Instrumental concern	Relational concern	
Face concern	(self only)	(self and other)		(self only)	(self and other)	
Face focus	Self	Self	Other	Other	Self	Other
Conflict style	Disintegrative	Aligning	Balancing	Smoothing	Aligning or Balancing	Balancing or Smoothing
Communication style	Direct	Direct	Direct and Indirect	Indirect	Direct and Indirect	Indirect

Source: Frances P. Brew and David R. Cairns, “Styles of Managing Interpersonal Workplace Conflict in Relation to Status and Face Concern: A Study with Anglos and Chinese.” *International Journal of Conflict Management* 15, no. 1 (2004): 48.

The disadvantage with Table 3 is that it significantly simplifies the complexity of facework. The overall goal of facework is to promote a positive image in one’s social network, but there are multitudes of sub-goals dependent on the situation. Hsien Chin Hu in a 1944 study titled, “The Chinese Concepts of ‘Face.’” listed 26 different definitions, perceptions, and categories of face.<sup>353</sup> According to Worm and Frankenstein, the six most important of these are:

1. Enhancing one’s own face
2. Enhancing other’s face
3. Losing one’s own face
4. Hurting other’s face
5. Saving one’s own face
6. Compensation (restore, retaliate, self-defense)<sup>354</sup>

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<sup>352</sup>Ibid.

<sup>353</sup>Hu, “The Chinese Concepts of ‘Face.’” 46-60.

<sup>354</sup>Worm and Frankenstein, “The Dilemma of Managerial Cooperation,” 273.

An individual will thus use one or more conflict management styles to accomplish one of the above sub-goals depending on the situation.

There are many ways to maintain or enhance one's own face. One must ensure that all relationships and societal duties are fulfilled properly. One must maintain a proper and harmonious relationship with one's supervisor, parents, spouse, children, co-workers, subordinates, and friends. It is possible to enhance one's face by obtaining a promotion, higher education, or through social work. It is also possible to enhance one's own face by enhancing another's face. Success of a child, student, or subordinate always reflects positively upon the parent, instructor, or supervisor.

Maintaining or enhancing other's face usually requires some element of active management. Examples of this behavior include ritualistic greetings for superiors, compliments, or avoiding arguments. In horizontal in-group relationships, a negotiator may request the other to "give me face" so that solution that is acceptable to all can be found. According to Hwang, Chinese couples may construct their relationship either in the traditional, Confucian vertical method or in a more modern horizontal way.<sup>355</sup> In the case of an argument within a modern family, "if one of the couple (usually the male) uses verbal or nonverbal communication to ask for compromise, "gives face" to the other, and enable her/him to "get off the stage," it is quite possible that their unhappiness will be eliminated."<sup>356</sup> Unfortunately, not all conflicts are resolved ideally, so it may be that all parties agree to disagree and only keep superficial harmony. This is called by the Chinese *fu-yen mianzi*, "caring about other's face superficially."<sup>357</sup> For example, a male subject reported in a study concerning an irreconcilable conflict with his parents:

Now they are living in their own way, and we are living in ours. Though we are living under the same roof, they sleep in that room, and we sleep in this room. We eat separately, my parents cook their food, my wife and I cook ours.....The

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<sup>355</sup>Hwang, "Guanzi and Mientze: Conflict Resolution in Chinese Society," 26.

<sup>356</sup>Ibid., 31.

<sup>357</sup>Ibid., 28.

two old parents still want to keep the superficial ethics. They are afraid of being scorned by relatives and friends. Though they blame me and accuse of my conduct against filial piety everyday, they still tell our relatives and friends that they have filial children.<sup>358</sup>

Just as there are a number of ways to enhance face, there is also many ways to lose face. One can lose face by poor behavior, poor performance on the job, insulting one's parents, or even losing one's job. Hu differentiates between loosing *lian* and loosing *mianzi*, the former having much more serious consequences. To lose *lian* "is a blemish on the character of the individual."<sup>359</sup> To lose *mianzi*, on the other hand, is much milder, such as losing one's job, and can be recovered.<sup>360</sup> While divorce was traditionally frowned upon as immoral, recently it has gained more acceptance and therefore less loss of face.<sup>361</sup>

Because face has communal and social characteristics, international politics sometimes suffer from the accidental loss of face. In April of 2006, the Bush administration hosted a visit from Chinese President Hu Jintao. At the beginning of the visit, an announcer stated the band would play the national anthem of the Republic of China, which is the official name of Taiwan not the People's Republic of China.<sup>362</sup> Later, during a joint press conference, a Falun Gong activist began heckling the Chinese president. It took three very long minutes before the Secret Service was able to remove her.<sup>363</sup> Both incidences were accidental but the result was the appearance of incompetence by the Bush administration and therefore a loss of face for the US.

Just as it is possible to lose one's own face, it is also possible to intentionally harm another's face. Usually when one person directly causes the loss of face of another, it is considered extremely confrontational, disruptive to harmony, and rude. As a result, both parties

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<sup>358</sup>Ibid., 29.

<sup>359</sup>Hu, "The Chinese Concepts of 'Face,'" 46.

<sup>360</sup>Ibid., 56.

<sup>361</sup>Yu, "The Chinese 'Native' Perspective on Mao-Dun," 77.

<sup>362</sup>Dana Milbank, "China and its President Greeted by a Host of Indignities," [Article on-line], available from [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/20/AR2006042001946\\_pf.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/20/AR2006042001946_pf.html); Internet; accessed on 11 March 2007.

<sup>363</sup>Ibid.

lose face. An example of this occurred during the above mentioned state visit. China requested a formal state visit but the Bush administration only granted an official visit and did not host a formal state dinner.<sup>364</sup> A visit by the previous Chinese president was, on the other hand, a formal state visit, and the intentional slight to President Hu Jintao caused both the US and China to lose face.

In the case of a loss of face, one may take action to immediately recover it or prevent the loss proactively in the process by saving face. According to Jia, “face threatening moves are a primary source of conflicts among the Chinese.”<sup>365</sup> However, a quick thinking, observant individual can turn a potentially disastrous situation into one that maintains good feelings, harmony, and face. For example, two instructors are speaking to a group of students. One instructor was at one time the student of the other. A member of the audience pays a large compliment to the younger instructor before addressing the senior instructor. The younger instructor in turn directs the compliment to the instructor by responding, “it is only because of the superior instruction I received.” In this case, the compliment to the younger instructor ahead of the senior could be perceived as a loss of face for the senior instructor. The junior instructor recognizes this and redirects the compliment to save the senior instructor’s face. The end result is that both instructors’ face is enhanced instead of degraded.

Graham and Lam in the Harvard Business Review give a good example of saving face:

Honeywell-Bull won negotiation rights for an order of 100 ATMs from the Bank of China. Toward the end of the process, the bank buyer asked for deeper price cuts. To him, the sticking point wasn’t just a matter of thrift. He told the Honeywell-Bull representatives, “If the price isn’t reduced further, I will lose face.” This is Chinese for “The deal will be off, and we’ll talk to your competitor.” The seasoned Honeywell-Bull executive responded that he had some room to move in the bid, but the lower price would not allow for training Chinese managers in the States. The Chinese representatives then asked for a ten-minute break and came back smiling, agreeing to all the terms. In retrospect, the training

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<sup>364</sup>Ibid.

<sup>365</sup>Jia, “Facework as a Chinese Conflict-Preventive Mechanism,” 50.

program was much more important to the Chinese executive. The U.S. trip for his staff yielded him more *mianzi* than the requested price break.<sup>366</sup>

The last category of facework involves compensation. This may involve actions to restore face or retaliate against another who caused a loss of face. For example, an employee lost face because of a conflict with another employee. In retaliation, the first employee then approached the supervisor and causes the second employee to get demoted or lose a bonus.<sup>367</sup> Another example involved the EP-3 incident. The Chinese demanded an apology from the US in order to restore face.<sup>368</sup>

## **Chinese Preferences for Non-Confrontational Conflict Management**

Chinese preferences for conflict management styles directly relate to the elements of Chinese culture presented in chapter 4 and Hofstede's five dimensions from chapter 2. According to Hofstede (see Table 1), the Chinese are low on individualism, medium on masculinity and uncertainty avoidance, and high on power distance and long-term orientation.<sup>369</sup> Thus, when compared to Americans, the Chinese tend to be non-confrontational in their approach to conflict.<sup>370</sup> The Chinese emphasize preserving both self and other-face.<sup>371</sup> The maintenance of harmony generates stability and substance within hierarchical relationships and centralized government in order to maintain power distance.<sup>372</sup> Following *li*, social rules, eliminates an element of uncertainty within relationships, since all know how others should behave. Chinese entrepreneurs have a greater appreciation for cooperative strategies compared to American

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<sup>366</sup> Graham and Lam, "The Chinese Negotiation," 90.

<sup>367</sup> Tjosvold and Sun, "Understanding Conflict Avoidance," 152.

<sup>368</sup> Karon, "Wanted: Some Diplomatic Choreography to End China Standoff."

<sup>369</sup> Hofstede, "Cultural Constraints in Management Theories," 91.

<sup>370</sup> Yu, "The Chinese 'Native' Perspective on Mao-Dun," 68; Chow and Ding, "Moral Judgement and Conflict Handling Styles," 670.

<sup>371</sup> Fan and Zigang, "Cross-Cultural Challenges when Doing Business in China," 86.

<sup>372</sup> Leung, Koch, and Lu, "A Dualistic Model of Harmony," 208; Fan and Zigang, "Cross-Cultural Challenges when Doing Business in China," 83.

entrepreneurs.<sup>373</sup> Furthermore, the Chinese change their style of conflict behavior depending on the type of relationship because of the importance of social status and large power distance. One important point is that the holistic and long-viewed nature of Chinese culture affects all styles of conflict management. According to Fan and Zigang:

Chinese depend more on groups or institutions to determine what they should do and emphasize loyalty to the group. They are more likely to cooperate with others to avoid risks and reduce responsibilities. Their value systems appreciate duty to the group and harmony among its members while pursuing personal goals is viewed rather negatively in China. They will try to use indirect ways to avoid direct and open conflict. When they face conflict, they prefer to use authority to suppress it, or settle things in private. They prefer to resolve conflict through negotiation and compromise. The strong collective orientation and uncertainty avoidance values in China encourage Chinese managers to use indirect forms of influence that involve the assistance of a third party.<sup>374</sup>

As shown above, the Chinese use both similar and dissimilar methods of interpersonal conflict management than Americans, but their preferences differ significantly. Some styles, such as the compromising, collaborating, and competitive styles from the dual concern model, are very similar to American behaviors. Others are drastically different, such as accommodating and avoiding styles from the dual concern models as well as an additional style not addressed by any model, third party involvement. All styles change in some way to reflect the nature of the relationship. The dual harmony model is intended to augment the dual concern model to address the Chinese emphasis on harmony and the quality of relationships. In general, the Chinese prefer a non-confrontational style such as third-party involvement, avoidance, accommodation, compromise, and collaboration. Competing is the least preferred and only used under very specific circumstances. Facework, not a conflict management style in itself, provides an overarching strategy to maintain one's face within the group and may determine which style to use over another. With this information, the next step is to apply these behaviors to specific case studies.

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<sup>373</sup>Ibid., 85.

<sup>374</sup>Ibid.

## CHAPTER 6: Case studies

While conflict management styles do not necessarily translate directly from the interpersonal to the strategic level, the underlying cultural values discussed in chapter 4 certainly impact international negotiations and strategic culture.<sup>375</sup> There are definite similarities as any negotiation involves not only the countries but the individuals representing each country. For example, Andrew Scobell in his article “China and Strategic Culture” quotes Chinese Lieutenant General Li Jijun, former vice president of the Academy of Military Sciences:

Culture is the root and foundation of strategy. Strategic thinking, in the process of its evolutionary history, flows into the mainstream of a country or a nation’s culture. Each country or nation’s strategic culture cannot but bear the imprint of cultural traditions, which in a subconscious and complex way, prescribes and defines strategy making.<sup>376</sup>

Alastair Iain Johnston in his book, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, analyzed Chinese strategic culture present in the *Seven Military Classics* and actions of the Chinese government against the Mongols during the Ming dynasty.<sup>377</sup> He found that there existed two very different Chinese strategic cultures, the *parabellum* and the Confucian-Mencian paradigms.<sup>378</sup>

In the *parabellum* paradigm “conflict is a constant feature of human affairs” and occurs within a zero-sum context.<sup>379</sup> Violence is an effective way of dealing with an out-group enemy and there is “a preference for offensive strategies followed by progressively less coercive ones, where accommodation is ranked last.”<sup>380</sup> Johnston defines strategic accommodation in a similar

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<sup>375</sup> Alfred D. Wilhelm, *The Chinese at the Negotiating Table: Style and Characteristics* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1994), xxxiii.

<sup>376</sup> Andrew Scobell, *China and Strategic Culture* (Carlise, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, May 2002), 1.

<sup>377</sup> Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, viv.

<sup>378</sup> *Ibid.*, x, 249.

<sup>379</sup> *Ibid.*, 249.

<sup>380</sup> *Ibid.*

fashion to the dual concern model accommodating style of interpersonal conflict management.<sup>381</sup>

This paradigm assumes the clearly defined out-group enemy who could be treated with a competitive style of conflict management when they were militarily weaker than the Chinese and accommodated when stronger to buy time. According to Johnston, “this paradigm comes closest to Western notions of hard realpolitik in statecraft, or the tradition--as the term suggests--that assumes axiomatically that ‘if you want peace, then prepare for war.’”<sup>382</sup>

The Confucian-Mencian paradigm assumes conflict is undesirable and avoidable through good government and the “co-opting or enculturation of external threats.”<sup>383</sup> Minimum force should be used, only under unavoidable defensive conditions, and only as a righteous cause. This paradigm is closer to and supported by the trends noted in chapter 5 on Chinese preferences and styles of interpersonal conflict management. Thus, the strategy preferences for this paradigm rank

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<sup>381</sup> Johnston defines the three types of grand strategy as follows:

“Accommodationist: This strategy relies primarily on diplomacy, political trading, economic incentives, bandwagoning, and balancing alliance behavior, among other low-coercion policies. Security is achieved primarily through informal and formal alliance building, or uni-, bi-, or multilateral concessions. Accommodationist grand strategies imply that the ends of policy, while not necessarily well defined, exclude the physical and political elimination of the adversary and the annexation of its territory.”

“Defensive: This grand strategy is more coercive in nature than an accommodationist strategy. It relies primarily on static defense along an external boundary. The use of force is not designed to annex territory or to destroy the political leadership or structures of the enemy state. Security is supplied primarily through the internal mobilization of resources for military purposes rather than through alliance building. Defensive grand strategies imply that the ends of policy are not, at that moment, expansionist or annexationist. This category captures the notion of deterrence through denial or limited punishment.”

“Offensive/Expansionist: This strategy is highly coercive, relying primarily on the offensive, preventive, preemptive, or predominantly punitive uses of military force beyond immediate borders. The strategic goal behind the use of military force is total military victory and the political destruction of the adversary, including annexation of at least some territory. As for the political ends of an expansionist grand strategy, these are not necessarily revisionist or imperialist in nature. As noted above, strategic expansionism can also be motivated by efforts to preserve or return to a political or even territorial status quo. In fact, this category of grand strategy makes no assumptions about the political ends of the state, though clearly, by implication, if a state did have revisionist or expansionist political goals it would presumably prefer this type of grand strategy over a defensive or accommodationist one. Regardless of political aims, however, there is a common denominator: namely, at a minimum, the elimination of the adversary’s military capabilities and, at a maximum, the destruction of the adversary’s political capacity as a means of achieving security.” Ibid., 112-113.

<sup>382</sup>Ibid., 249.

<sup>383</sup>Ibid.

“accommodationist strategies first, followed by defensive and then offensive strategies.”<sup>384</sup>

According to Johnston, “it is this paradigm that seems to dominate, explicitly or implicitly, Western and Chinese scholarship on Chinese strategic thought and provides the basis for claims of Chinese uniqueness or difference on this score.”<sup>385</sup>

According to Johnston, these two paradigms do not have equal status in either the *Seven Military Classics* or the actions of the Ming dynasty; the *parabellum* paradigm is usually dominant.<sup>386</sup> Johnston theorizes that this behavior carries through to Mao Zedong as well.<sup>387</sup> According to Johnston, “the PRC has been involved in eleven foreign-policy crises, and resorted to violence in eight of these [from 1949] through 1985,” all fought on or near their boarders or within their territory.<sup>388</sup> Furthermore, “post-1949 China’s use of force in a crisis appears to have been related to improved relative capabilities...When in a crisis, China tended to act in a more conflictual manner as it grew relatively stronger.”<sup>389</sup> Scobell supports this observation, “Chinese elites believe strongly that their country’s strategic tradition is pacifist, nonexpansionist, and purely defensive but at the same time able to justify virtually any use of force--including offensive and preemptive strikes--as defensive in nature.”<sup>390</sup>

In his analysis, Johnston is missing three recent developments that may update the *parabellum* and Confucian-Mencian paradigm balance. First, historically the enemy has been relatively easy to determine and therefore easy to establish an out-group competitive style of conflict management. As mentioned in chapter 5, Mao Zedong clearly defined who the enemies of the Chinese were. With the push for globalization and economic integration, determining

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<sup>384</sup>Ibid.

<sup>385</sup>Ibid.

<sup>386</sup>Ibid.

<sup>387</sup>Ibid., 255.

<sup>388</sup>Ibid., 256.

<sup>389</sup>Ibid., 257.

<sup>390</sup>Scobell, “China and Strategic Culture,” 3.

exactly who is an enemy is becoming increasingly difficult.<sup>391</sup> Second, the recent globalization and economic integration has made the Chinese more sensitive to international opinion, and more importantly, international face. Historically, China considered itself the center of the world and therefore internal face was the only facework concern for the Chinese government.<sup>392</sup> Now, the CCP must balance internal face concerns with external issues. Finally, Johnston's analysis assumes the Chinese government is one unified entity. While this may have been more valid during Mao Zedong's rule, more recent CCP presidents have had to balance internal factions.<sup>393</sup> For example, arguably the PLA is considerably more hawkish than other elements of the government.<sup>394</sup>

Because these developments may shift the balance between the use of the *parabellum* and Confucian-Mencian paradigm, the following case studies look at the ongoing conflicts between China and North Korea and Taiwan from the Confucian-Mencian paradigm perspective. These are two of the eleven foreign-policy crises mentioned above and have the potential of impacting US interests in the future. This view allows a military member to apply the Chinese cultural influences presented in chapter 4 and the Chinese styles of conflict management presented in chapter 5 to real-world, contemporary events.

### **Case Study 1: China and North Korea**

Culturally, the Chinese people look at conflicts holistically, but in the case of North Korea and Taiwan, history creates an even stronger link between these two countries. The Korean

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<sup>391</sup> Michael D. Swaine, "Chinese Crisis Management: Framework for Analysis, Tentative Observations, and Questions for the Future," in Chinese National Security Decisionmaking Under Stress ed. Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2005), 17; Samuel S. Kim, *China's Quest for Security in the Post-Cold War World* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 29 July 1996), 8.

<sup>392</sup> Feng and Bodde, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, 181, 189.

<sup>393</sup> Swaine, "Chinese Crisis Management: Framework for Analysis," 22, 24.

<sup>394</sup> Quansheng Zhao, *China's New Approach to Conflict Management* (Washington, DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, May 2006), 39.

peninsula has always been contentious territory between the regional powers of China, Japan, Russia then the Soviet Union, and the US. Historically, Korea had alternately been an independent state with significant autonomy or a key Chinese tributary state from the early fifth century until 1895 and often served as a security buffer between China and Japan.<sup>395</sup> When China was defeated in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95, the Qing dynasty signed the treaty of Shimonoseki which ceded control of Taiwan to Japan. During the late 1800s, Korea played the major powers against each other in order to provide time and space to modernize but with China's loss to Japan in 1895, a Japanese-British alliance established in 1902, Russia's loss during the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, and US interests focused on the Philippines, Korea was unable to prevent Japanese occupation in 1905 that ended with World War II in 1945.<sup>396</sup>

The aftermath of World War II set the stage for the division of Korea and subsequent events. Unlike the well developed post-war Japanese occupation plan, the US had no plan for post-war Korea nor was there any consultation with the Koreans concerning their future.<sup>397</sup> On the eve of the Japanese surrender, the US recognized a Soviet controlled Korean peninsula was undesirable and proposed dividing the nation into two temporary occupation zones along the thirty-eighth parallel. Thus in the south the US sponsored the Republic of Korea (ROK), while in the north the Soviet sponsored the People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), both established in 1948. Both claim to be the rightful government of all of Korea.<sup>398</sup> After the majority of US and Soviet forces departed in 1949, civil war broke out along the boarder between the ROK and DPRK. In June of 1950, North Korea, with Chinese and Soviet backing, invaded south with the intention of reunification. Eventually, the invasion was repulsed by a US lead United Nations force, China intervened militarily to prevent the DPRK's destruction, and the armistice agreement of 1953 put

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<sup>395</sup>Ibid., 12

<sup>396</sup>Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), 4-5.

<sup>397</sup>Ibid., 5-6.

<sup>398</sup>Ibid., 7.

the demilitarized zone close to the original division line.<sup>399</sup> China later formalized its relationship with North Korea through the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.

Over the past five decades, while the relationship between China and North Korea waned during the 1970s and 1980s due to the Soviets ability to support North Korean military and economic needs, the relationship type has always been a vertical. With the extreme importance of Chinese support to North Korea, China looks at the relationship as vertical in-group, parent client-state. During the 1950's, China pursued a bilateral approach to any Korean issues, or was cut out by the Soviets overriding influence. Since 1988, China has moved towards balancing role in a multilateral construct and positioned itself as a mediator between North and South Korea.<sup>400</sup> China needs a stable regional environment in order to concentrate on domestic economic development.<sup>401</sup> North Korea's recent actions, including pursuing nuclear weapons, appear to be an attempt to flatten the relationship, but China is resisting. A nuclear North Korea could generate an arms race in the region, especially with Japan.<sup>402</sup> Six party talks have been a way for China to establish itself as a responsible world power, which increase its face. Then recently China has shifted its policy from a passive position to a more active one.

The October 2006, North Korean nuclear weapon test forced China to back off its policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations. This test caused a significant loss of face to Beijing. The immediate result was a public statement from the Chinese government referring to North Korea's actions as "brazen."<sup>403</sup> According to a senior US administration official, "China was humiliated. This very public loss of face immediately forced China to take action, some public, some private, to restore face and re-assert the vertical nature of the

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<sup>399</sup>Ibid., 8.

<sup>400</sup>Quansheng Zhao, *China's New Approach to Conflict Management*, 18, 20.

<sup>401</sup>Ibid., 24.

<sup>402</sup>Andrew Scobell, "China and North Korea: The Limits of Influence," *Current History* 102, no. 665 (September 2003): 275.

<sup>403</sup>Magnier, "North Korean Threat Different for China,"

relationship. They had no choice but to support the resolution that the U.S. and others put forward.”<sup>404</sup> China quietly ordered its banks to suspend dealings with North Korea, cut oil exports, and voted in favor of the United Nations resolution condemning the test.<sup>405</sup> Under pressure from China, North Korea attended the most recent session of six party talks in February of 2007. Due to shuttle diplomacy from China, significant strides were made when North Korea agreed to close its nuclear facilities in exchange for emergency oil and future discussions on the normalization of relations with Japan and the US.<sup>406</sup> The agreement not only helped regain and enhance China’s lost face, but established China as a successful negotiatory partner in a critical global problem.

Again, while interpersonal conflict management styles do not exactly translate into strategic conflict management styles, it may be useful to look at what actions the US and China could take based on both the dual concern and dual harmony models. This is not necessarily the actions taken in the real negotiations, which would be a topic for a different monograph, but a way for an American to look at the situation from the Chinese perspective and potentially achieve a better resolution.

When dealing with the North Koreans, China’s view of the relationship as vertical, in-group, North Korea’s low concern for value harmony and medium concern for instrumental harmony, and China’s facework requirement to compensate for their loss of face would likely lead to a conflict management style that would be classified as smoothing from the dual harmony model and competing or dominating from the dual concern model. As the superior in vertical relationship, China can use far more direct and competitive behaviors to encourage North Korea

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<sup>404</sup>Gordon Fairclough and Neil King, Jr., “Behind China’s Stance on North Korea,” [Article on-line], available from <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/earlybird/Nov2006/e20061106466256.html>; Internet; accessed on 6 November 2006.

<sup>405</sup>Ibid.

<sup>406</sup>US Department of State, “North Korea - Denuclearization Action Plan,” [Article on-line]. available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/february/80479.htm>; Internet; accessed on 28 February 2007.

to return to its proper place in the relationship. In regards to their conflict management style in dealing with the US on North Korean issues, the nuclear test may have moved China from a “Machiavellian” smoothing style to a more balancing style, as shown by its willingness to mediate during the last six party talks.

The US relationship with the North Koreans has always been competitive in nature. However, since China’s rise in influence with the North Koreans, the US relationship with China in regards to the North Korean situation has oscillated between competing in order to force North Korea to comply with international norms and compromising in order to get the necessary support for action against the North Korea. With the unexpected and sudden Chinese willingness to pressure North Korea after the nuclear test, the US responded in kind, compromising to allow an agreement during the February of 2007 talks. Because China seems to be stepping forward towards a greater role in the stability in the region, the US may achieve better results by moving to a more collaborative/balancing style. Not only could it achieve better results with North Korea, but the increased harmony between the US and China could have a more holistic positive effect in other areas.

## **Case Study 2: China and Taiwan**

The US involvement in the China-Taiwan conflict began during the Chinese Civil War with American support for Chiang Kai-shek. The Chinese intervention in the Korean War complicated the PLA plan to attack Taiwan to destroy the remnants of Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist army. To protect Taiwan, President Truman ordered the US Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait, thus involving the US in the conflict. Thus creating a popular saying, “it was Kim Il-Sung who saved Chiang Kai-shek.”<sup>407</sup> The bond between the US and Taiwan was formalized

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<sup>407</sup>Zhao, “China’s New Approach to Conflict Management,” 10.

by the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty. Since then, China's relationship with both the US and Taiwan has varied, sometimes significantly.

Of the two relationships, the one between China and the US has changed the most. As previously mentioned, Mao Zedong called the US an enemy and therefore all conflict with the US was antagonistic in nature, clearly labeling the US part of the out-group.<sup>408</sup> After Mao's death in 1978, Deng Xiaoping began a program of reform and economic development, opening China to Western companies for joint ventures along with other changes. Despite the growing economic integration between China and the US, the US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the collision of a Navy EP-3 surveillance aircraft with a Chinese fighter in 2001 heightened US-China tensions.<sup>409</sup> The rhetoric from both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the PLA was publicly antagonistic, indicating the US was still considered very much an out-group enemy. The 11 September attacks on the US caused a major shift in US policy from pressure on China to anti-terrorism coalition building.<sup>410</sup> Thus, the US perception of China has shifted since then from that of a rival to a potential partner.

Between China and Taiwan, the Chinese desire a vertical relationship but it appears to have flattened over the years. China has encouraged economic integration, allows a large trade surplus in Taiwan's favor, and pursues significant Taiwanese investment on the mainland.<sup>411</sup> Furthermore, many Taiwanese move to China each year for economic and familial reasons, strengthening cultural ties.<sup>412</sup> This flattening of the relationship type does not reduce China's steadfast goal of re-uniting the island with the mainland. Chinese domestic politics will not allow Taiwanese independence (*Taidu*).<sup>413</sup> With growing nationalism due to economic development

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<sup>408</sup>Mao Zedong, "On Contradiction."

<sup>409</sup>See Appendix B for timeline and more details concerning the incident.

<sup>410</sup>Zhao, "China's New Approach to Conflict Management," 22-23.

<sup>411</sup>*Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>412</sup>*Ibid.*, 35.

<sup>413</sup>*Ibid.*, 13.

and modernization, an independent Taiwan would cause people to question the legitimacy of the CPP government. No Chinese leader wants to be known as the one that allowed the split of the nation. It could also encourage like-minded territories, such as Xinjiang and Tibet, to also attempt independence from the PRC.<sup>414</sup> Election of pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has also caused the relationship to deteriorate. Another concern is that a prolonged separation may cause eventual independence. Therefore, China has two courses of action to pursue Taiwan reunification: “Economic Integration Based Unification” (EIU) and “Taiwan Independence Led War” (TIW).<sup>415</sup> The EIU strategy is a long-term program of cross-Strait economic and cultural integration to lead to political accommodation. If Taiwan makes an overt move towards independence, the TIW plan would be implemented. Unfortunately, the TIW plan will cause significant economic damage to both China and Taiwan and cause China a loss of face worldwide. To date, China has been pursuing the long-term, holistic, compromising EIU course of action, but has been publicly increasing military expenditures and readiness.

Again, the same caveat on the difference between interpersonal and strategic conflict management styles applies. This is a look at what actions the US and China could take based on both the dual concern and dual harmony models.

China's view their relationship with Taiwan as a vertical, in-group. However, while China has a long history with the Koreans, they are not Chinese, but Taiwan is. This sets up a very different relationship which may be looked at as a Confucian “father-son” or “elder-younger brother” relationship. In addition, Taiwan has not performed any acts comparable to the North Korean nuclear weapons test; therefore China has not lost international face with respect to Taiwan. The fact that Taiwan is still a separate territory causes the CCP to lose face domestically. This leads to a conflict management style towards Taiwan that could be classified as aligning

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<sup>414</sup>Ibid., 46.

<sup>415</sup>Ibid., 31.

from the dual harmony model, due to the high concern for creating value harmony through economic and cultural integration and medium to low concern for instrumental harmony. China's behavior when viewed through the dual concern model is accommodation, for the short-term. China's conflict management style towards the US with regards to Taiwan is smoothing and compromising. China is willing to tolerate or assist the US in other areas of international concern in order to gain US pressure on Taiwan. In the long-term, though, China will not compromise on their fundamental goal of reuniting the country.

When looking at the Taiwan issue from the US perspective, the relationship with Taiwan has been very accommodating. The US continues to offer "defensive" weapons to Taiwan, sails carrier battle groups through the Taiwan Strait to send signals of American resolve to China, and supports Taiwan in everything except independence. The US relationship with China over Taiwan has been at best competing and at worst avoiding. By avoiding the issue of Taiwan, the US loses any ability to profit from the importance of regaining Taiwan to China. Moving to a compromising style, or a dual harmony smoothing style, could allow the US to gain concessions in areas which are more important to the US but of lesser importance to China. These areas could include North Korea or economic issues. Looking holistically at all of the issues and their interactions may allow for results which are unachievable from just using the standard, American forms of conflict management.

Overall, China's emphasis on gentle and friendly relationships within the region has paid off. The US has actively and publicly discouraged pro-independence Taiwanese sediments.<sup>416</sup> South Korea announced in January of 2005 that it would stay neutral in the event of a regional conflict within Northeast Asia, thus indicating that they may stay neutral in the event of war between China and Taiwan. China's cooperation with the US has caused North Korea to abandon its nuclear program, at least temporarily, which reduces the likelihood of an Asian arms race.

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<sup>416</sup>Mahbubani, Kishore, "Understanding China," *Foreign Affairs* 84 (2005): 56.

China also sent 1,000 troops to southern Lebanon in support of the United Nation's peacekeeping operation.<sup>417</sup> Thus, China is slowly developing an international *guanxi*, social network, that it may be able to gain assistance from in the future.

During the last four years, it would be hard to argue that the US has been as successful as China in increasing its face in the rest of the world or within the international social network. Learning about Chinese methods of conflict management cannot hurt, and the potential is there for improving the outcome of conflicts with any adversary.

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<sup>417</sup>Fairclough and King, "Behind China's Stance on North Korea."

## CHAPTER 7: Conclusion

Currently, America's military focus is on its involvement against terrorism, especially in the Middle East. However, China may be a major competitor into the future, potential conflict areas abound from nuclear weapons in North Korea, China's increasing influence in South America and Africa to secure access to natural resources, territory disputes with neighbors especially off shore, and internal issues such as Tibet, democracy, and capitalism. America's actions in each of these areas will determine whether these issues are managed peacefully or become the spark that sets off war.

In order to avoid a major conflict with the Chinese, the US military must do a better job of understanding the Chinese than their understanding of the current foes. If, after sixteen years of conflict in the Middle East, US policy makers cannot explain the difference between Shia and Sunni, what can be expected of senior leaders in their understanding of issues with China? If policy makers do not understand the basic elements underlying a conflict, they cannot accurately express to the American population or the world justification for action.

Before considering military action within another nation, one must understand its culture and how it differs from America. Numerous cross-cultural studies exist to help policy maker and military leaders do just that. Hofstede's five dimension model showed that the most significant differences between American and Chinese cultures are the US short-term views versus Chinese long-term orientation, American individualism versus their collectivism, and power distance between leaders and citizens.

Chinese culture is defined by its history of agrarianism, highly contextual language, Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism, and most recently Mao Zedong's influence. The Chinese have built up more than 3,000 years of culture versus the barely 500 years since Columbus arrived in America. Within this culture, knowledge of the five elements discussed in chapter 4 is essential. *Mianzi* and *lian*, face, are the most important, underlying all Chinese relationships while *he*,

harmony, is most common justification given for a choice of a particular conflict management style. However, *guanxi*, personal connections; *shehui dengji*, social status; and *zhengti guannian*, holistic thinking, contribute as well and must be taken into consideration.

These cultural differences directly translate into the similarities and differences in the preferred methods of interpersonal conflict management. Americans say they prefer collaborating or compromising techniques, but unconsciously tend towards competing. When compared to the Chinese, Americans are assertive and adversarial in their approach to conflict management. The Chinese, on the other hand, prefer non-confrontational strategies in order to maintain a harmonious relationship but will modify particular styles depending on the nature of the relationship. They will often involve a third party to mediate and think much more positively about avoidance and accommodation than Americans. Like the Americans, the Chinese also prefer compromise and collaboration, providing that common ground already exists between the two parties. Facework provides an overarching strategy to maintain one's face within the group and determines which style has preference in a given circumstance.

Along with similarities and differences in preferences between the Americans and the Chinese, there are similarities and differences between style types and how each is utilized. Because the dual concern model, popular in the US, does not accurately describe Chinese behaviors, it was necessary to adapt the definitions of each style through relationship type and Chinese cultural values. Some styles, such as the compromising and collaborating styles, are very similar to American behaviors. Others are drastically different, such as accommodating and competitive styles which have different behavior depending on the relationship type. The Chinese use of the avoiding style is perhaps the most different from Americans, with usage varying depending on the quality of the relationship. In order to address the quality of harmony desired within the relationship, the dual harmony model presented by Leung and others is used to augment the dual concern model. Furthermore, there is one Chinese style of interpersonal conflict management not present in any of the models, third party involvement.

With the expansion of the dual concern model, augmentation by the dual harmony, and addition of the third party involvement style, it is possible to develop a firm understanding of potential Chinese behaviors during conflicts. While this understanding of interpersonal conflict management styles does not directly translate into strategic negotiations, it can be used in thought experiments such as the scenarios with North Korea and Taiwan in chapter 6.

America and China are not fated to become military adversaries. However, it is guaranteed that current and future conflicts will involve both nations, either as adversaries, partners, or intermediaries. Understanding China is the first step in ensuring that American interests are best served in these future conflicts. Burying America's head in the proverbial sand or thinking that future adversaries are no different than Americans in the same situation can only lead to defeat.

## APPENDIX A: Mainland China Dynasties

Dynastic Period <sup>418</sup>	Years
Legendary Sage Emperors	2852 - 2255 BC
Hsia	2205 - 1766
Shang	1766 - 1045
Chou	
Western Zhou	1045 - 770
Eastern Zhou	770 - 256
Spring & Autumn Period	722 - 481
Warring States	403 - 221
Ch'in	221 - 206
Former Han (Western Han)	208 BC - AD 8
Later Han (Eastern Han)	AD 23 - 220
Six Dynasties Period	222 - 589
Three Kingdoms	222 - 280
Wei-Chin	220 - 316
Northern and Southern Dynasties	265 - 589
Sui	589 - 618
T'ang	618 - 907
Five Dynasties (Northern China)	907 - 959
Ten Kingdoms (Southern China)	907 - 979
Sung	960 - 1126
Southern Sung	1127 - 1297
Yuan (Mongol)	1279 - 1368
Ming	1368 - 1644
Ch'ing (Manchu)	1644 - 1911
Republic of China	1912 - 1949
People's Republic of China	1949 - present
Mao Zedong	1949 - 1976
Deng Xiaoping	1976 - 1989
Jiang Zemin	1989 - 2002
Hu Jintao	2002 - present

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<sup>418</sup>Sawyer, Sawyer, and Sun, *The Art of the Warrior: Leadership and Strategy from the Chinese Military Classics*, xiv.

## APPENDIX B: A Holistic Summary of the EP-3 Hainan Incident

In order to understand the Chinese anger and frustration over the EP-3 Hainan incident, one must look at the accident in the context of the broader picture of history, beginning with the “Century of Humiliation,” the 1999 bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, as well as increased cross-Strait tensions just before the incident.

The “Century of Humiliation” refers the time in Chinese history from the conclusion of the First Opium war in 1842 until the establishment of the PRC in 1949. In the early 1800s, the British Empire, through the trade of Indian raw cotton and opium, generated a large trade imbalance that resulted in the export of large amounts of silver.<sup>419</sup> When the Qing emperor attempted through force to stop the trade of opium, Chinese military forces were defeated by a British expedition. The resulting Treaty of Nanjing in 1842 was the first of a series of agreements with the Western trading nations later called by the Chinese the “unequal treaties.”<sup>420</sup> Later anti-imperial wars with the West granted more trade privileges and partial colonization while war with Japan in 1894-95 and again in 1937-45 resulted in significant casualties and the loss of territory and pride.<sup>421</sup> With the establishment of the PRC on 1 October 1949, the Chinese began to reacquire and consolidate the territory lost in the preceding century.<sup>422</sup> While the “Century of Humiliation” ended over fifty years ago, it was referenced often in Mao Zedong’s writings and speeches and played a significant role in China’s shift from Communism to nationalism.<sup>423</sup>

In the decade preceding the accidental bombing of China’s Belgrade embassy, China was feeling uneasy concerning the US’s strengthening of alliances with Europe and Asia, US military operations in Panama, Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia, and anti-China sentiments expressed in US

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<sup>419</sup>Bruce A. Elleman, *Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 15.

<sup>420</sup>Ibid., 31.

<sup>421</sup>Ibid., 94, 194-195.

<sup>422</sup>Ibid., 231.

<sup>423</sup>William A. Callahan, “National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism,” *Alternatives* 29 (2004): 201, 203.

domestic politics.<sup>424</sup> In April of 1999, President Clinton announced he would not support China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) at that time.<sup>425</sup> China was critical of the rational used by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to justify the bombing of Yugoslavia, that gross human rights violations, such as ethnic cleansing, justified the use of external force within a sovereign nation.<sup>426</sup> Thus the Sino-American relationship was already deteriorating when, on 7 May 1999, an American B-2 bomber dropped three 2,000 lb bombs on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. The immediate Chinese reaction was that the bombing was intentional and it set off deeply patriotic and angry reactions from the public across China.<sup>427</sup> President Jiang Zemin was sharply criticized for being soft towards the US.<sup>428</sup> In the end, the US and NATO apologized for the incident, a full briefing detailing the causes of the mistake was presented to the Chinese Foreign Minister, and the US agreed to pay \$32.5 million in damages.<sup>429</sup> The quick US apology and compensation agreement decreased tensions between the two nations and gave President Jiang Zemin flexibility to satisfy internal political demands.<sup>430</sup>

Although the tension after the embassy bombing had eased somewhat, Sino-American relations were still uneasy. Between 2000 and 2001, China had made several complaints concerning US surveillance flights off of its coast. At the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement meeting in May-June 2000, a Chinese military official claimed the number of patrols had increased to four or five times a week and stated these missions could only cause harm.<sup>431</sup> In

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<sup>424</sup>Paul H. B. Godwin, "Decisionmaking Under Stress: The Unintentional Bombing of China's Belgrade Embassy and the EP-3 Collision," in *Chinese National Security Decisionmaking Under Stress* ed. Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2005), 162, 163.

<sup>425</sup>Ibid., 163.

<sup>426</sup>Ibid.

<sup>427</sup>Ibid., 164.

<sup>428</sup>Ibid., 165.

<sup>429</sup>Ibid., 169, 170.

<sup>430</sup>Ibid., 171.

<sup>431</sup>Ibid., 173.

response to these missions, China began flying more aggressive fighter interceptions.<sup>432</sup> On 20 January 2001, US President George W. Bush took office and immediately identified China as a strategic competitor, reversing President Clinton's policy of engagement.<sup>433</sup> The rhetoric from the new administration took a more aggressive, cold war stance towards China.<sup>434</sup> President Bush also pushed for a National Missile Defense initiative which China objected to for security reasons.<sup>435</sup>

It was within this strategic framework that, on 1 April 2001 a US Navy EP-3 surveillance aircraft and PLA Navy F-8 fighter aircraft collided in international airspace off the coast of China over the South China Sea. The F-8 crashed into the sea, killing the pilot Lieutenant Command Wang Wei, while the badly damaged EP-3 made an emergency landing at an airfield on Hainan Island. The twenty-four EP-3 crewmembers were detained upon landing. The Chinese government immediately protested the EP-3's incursion into Chinese airspace and demanded the US take full responsibility and apologize for the accident. The Chinese people linked the EP-3 incident with the Belgrade embassy bombing, considering both events an extension of the "Century of Humiliation" and examples of American hegemonism.<sup>436</sup> The US refused to apologize, stating that the EP-3 crew had done nothing wrong.

Eleven days after the accident, the US and China came to the first of three diplomatic resolutions. The US Ambassador to China, Ambassador Joseph Prueher, delivered a letter stating that the US "was 'very sorry' for the loss suffered by the family of Wang Wei, and was 'very sorry' that the EP-3 entered China's airspace without verbal permission."<sup>437</sup> In turn, the crew was released and flown to Hawaii on 12 April 2001. The negotiations then turned to the return of the

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<sup>432</sup>Ibid., 174.

<sup>433</sup>Ibid., 171; Gries and Peng, "Culture Clash? Apologies East and West," 175.

<sup>434</sup>Godwin, "Decisionmaking Under Stress," 172.

<sup>435</sup>Gries and Peng, "Culture Clash? Apologies East and West," 175.

<sup>436</sup>Callahan, "National Insecurities," 202; Gries and Peng, "Culture Clash? Apologies East and West," 175.

<sup>437</sup>Godwin, "Decisionmaking Under Stress," 183.

aircraft, with the final agreement stating that the EP-3 would be disassembled and airlifted out.<sup>438</sup>

The third set of negotiations revolved around US compensation to China for the crew's detention and the preparation of the aircraft for airlift.<sup>439</sup>

Despite the hostile rhetoric from both sides during the first eleven days after the incident, Sino-American tensions decreased in the following months. The US continued to support China's admittance into the WTO and President Bush attended the APEC summit in China.<sup>440</sup> The events of 11 September caused the US to move its security focus away from China towards global terrorism, allowing the relationship to move towards normal.<sup>441</sup>

Most Americans viewed the EP-3 incident alone in isolation from history.<sup>442</sup> As shown above, the Chinese viewed the event as a part of a much larger tapestry. Several weeks after the EP-3 incident, a new national holiday, National Humiliation Day, was declared to remind the Chinese people of what they had experienced in the past in order to create a better future.<sup>443</sup> Thus, any future conflicts with the US or the West will be linked to the "Century of Humiliation," the Belgrade embassy bombing, and the EP-3 incident.

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<sup>438</sup>Ibid., 181.

<sup>439</sup>Ibid.

<sup>440</sup>Ibid., 184.

<sup>441</sup>Ibid., 185.

<sup>442</sup>Gries and Peng, "Culture Clash? Apologies East and West," 175.

<sup>443</sup>Callahan, "National Insecurities," 202.

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